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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation investigates modeling techniques and computing algorithms for 
detection of anomalous contents and traffic flows of ingress Internet traffic at an 
enterprise network gateway. Anomalous contents refer to a large volume of ingress 
packets whose contents are not wanted by enterprise users, such as unsolicited electronic 
messages (UNE). UNE are often sent by Botnet farms for network resource exploitation, 
information stealing, and they incur high costs in bandwidth waste. Many products have 
been designed to block UNE, but most of them rely on signature database(s) for 
matching, and they cannot recognize unknown attacks. To address this limitation, in this 
dissertation I propose a Progressive E-Message Classifier (PEC) to timely classify 
message patterns that are commonly associated with UNE. On the basis of a scoring and 
aging engine, a real-time scoreboard keeps track of detected feature instances of the 
detection features until they are considered either as UNE or normal messages. A 
mathematical model has been designed to precisely depict system behaviors and then set 
detection parameters. The PEC performance is widely studied using different parameters 
based on several experiments.  
The objective of anomalous traffic flow detection is to detect selfish 
Transmission Control Protocol, TCP, flows which do not conform to one of the handful 
of congestion control protocols in adjusting their packet transmission rates in the face of  
network congestion. Given that none of the operational parameters in congestion control 
are carried in the transmitted packets, a gateway can only use packet arrival times to 
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recover states of end to end congestion control rules, if any. We develop new techniques 
to estimate round trip time (RTT) using EWMA Lomb-Scargle periodogram, detect 
change of congestion windows by the CUSUM algorithm, and then finally predict 
detected congestion flow states using a prioritized decision chain. A high level finite 
state machine (FSM) takes the predictions as inputs to determine if a TCP flow follows a 
particular congestion control protocol. Multiple experiments show promising outcomes 
of classifying flows of different protocols based on the ratio of the aberrant transition 
count to normal transition count generated by FSM. 
 iv 
 
DEDICATION 
 
To My Wife and Parents 
 
 
 v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
First of all, I would like to thank Dr. Jyh-Charn Liu for his guidance, support and 
patience throughout my graduate study. He has been a constant source of inspiration and 
help. His suggestions and deep insight on academic domain knowledge contributed 
greatly to the completion of this dissertation, as well as to my academic achievements.  
I am immensely grateful to my committee members: Dr. Rabi N. Mahapatra, Dr. 
Dezhen Song, and Dr. Yu Ding. They gave me very helpful suggestions on improving 
the quality of this dissertation. I really appreciate their time spent with me on my 
research. 
I would like to express my appreciation to all of my colleagues, and in particular 
to Mr. Cheng-Chung Tan and Mr. Christopher Bodden. Mr. Tan helped generate 
important experiment outcomes, which are presented in parts of this dissertation. Mr. 
Bodden helped proofread and provided comments to improve the readability of the 
dissertation which I greatly appreciated. I also thank all of the members of the RTDS 
Lab at Texas A&M University for their research support during my Ph.D. study.  
Finally, thanks to my wife and parents for their encouragement, patience and 
love. Without their support, I would not have finished my Ph.D. degree. 
 
 vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... ii 
DEDICATION ..................................................................................................................iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................vi  
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ viii 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................xi 
CHAPTER I  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF TECHNICAL 
CHALLENGES ........................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER II  DETECTION OF CONTENT ANOMALY .............................................. 5 
2.1 Background ........................................................................................................... 5 
2.2 Existing Solutions ................................................................................................. 7 
2.3 PEC System Architecture ................................................................................... 12 
2.4 Low Computing Cost Algorithm ........................................................................ 16 
2.4.1 Scoring Function ..................................................................................... 16 
2.4.2 Aging Function ....................................................................................... 17 
2.5 Modeling of the PEC Behavior ........................................................................... 20 
CHAPTER III  PERFORMANCE OF CONTENT ANOMALY DETECTION ............ 29 
3.1 Experiment Configuration .................................................................................. 29 
3.2 Performance Evaluation ...................................................................................... 34 
3.2.1 Detection Latency ................................................................................... 34 
3.2.2 Throughput of Feature Parser ................................................................. 36 
3.2.3 Throughput of Blacklist Checking .......................................................... 37 
3.2.4 Scoreboard Throughput .......................................................................... 38 
3.2.5 Collision Ratio of Black List .................................................................. 40 
CHAPTER IV  DETECTION OF PACKET FLOW ANOMALY (ROUND TRIP 
TIME ESTIMATION) ............................................................................ 44 
4.1 Background ......................................................................................................... 44 
 vii 
 
4.2 Existing Solution................................................................................................. 48 
4.3 Limitation of Statistical Models to Detect  Non-cooperative Flows .................. 50 
4.4 Round Trip Time (RTT) Estimation ................................................................... 53 
4.5 DFT-based RTT Estimation................................................................................ 55 
4.6 EWMA Lomb-based RTT Estimation ................................................................ 60 
CHAPTER V  DETECTION OF PACKET FLOW ANOMALY (BEHAVIOR 
IDENTIFICATION) ................................................................................. 70 
5.1 Non-deterministic Periods for Cwnd Adjustments ............................................. 70 
5.2 Low Pass Filter Approach to Reduce Estimation Errors .................................... 71 
5.3 Dilemma between Detection Sensitivity and Robustness................................... 73 
5.4 Concurrent CUSUM Banks for Cwnd Behavior Detection ................................ 74 
5.5 Lossy Finite State Machine of Detecting Unknown Protocols ........................... 83 
CHAPTER VI  PERFORMANCE OF PACKET FLOW ANOMALY DETECTION ... 86 
6.1 Experiment Configuration .................................................................................. 86 
6.2 Performance Evaluation ...................................................................................... 87 
6.2.1 Cwnd Estimation..................................................................................... 87 
6.2.2 Differentiation of TCP-Reno from CBR ................................................ 90 
6.2.3 Differentiation of TCP-Reno from TCP-Vegas ...................................... 92 
6.2.4 Classification of Mixing Flows Using TCP-Reno FSM.........................  95 
6.2.5 Classification of Mixing Flows Using TCP-Vegas FSM........................ 98 
CHAPTER VII  CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 102 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 106 
 
 viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 Page 
Figure 1: PEC architecture. .............................................................................................. 13 
Figure 2: Score table and age table. ................................................................................. 17 
Figure 3: The spinning wheel algorithm in a CQ. ............................................................ 18 
Figure 4: An illustration of aging-scoring processes in CASS. ....................................... 20 
Figure 5: The incomplete Γ mapping between λM and 1 − 𝛼. ........................................ 23 
Figure 6: Detection latency based on S=24, M=55. ......................................................... 26 
Figure 7: Variation of the detection rate based on M=55 ................................................ 27 
Figure 8: Variation of the detection rate based on S=24. ................................................. 28 
Figure 9: Experimental set up of UNE Detection. ........................................................... 30 
Figure 10: A snapshot of the PEC status on the control console. .................................... 32 
Figure 11: Scoreboard operation. ..................................................................................... 33 
Figure 12: Detection latency of a single UNE source. ..................................................... 35 
Figure 13: Detection latency for multiple UNE sources. ................................................. 36 
Figure 14: Throughput of feature parser. ......................................................................... 37 
Figure 15: Throughput of the blacklist checking. ............................................................ 38 
Figure 16: Scoreboard throughput vs. queue sizes ........................................................... 39 
Figure 17: The collision ratio in blacklist. ....................................................................... 40 
Figure 18: Challenges and solutions of anomalous flow detection. ................................. 47 
Figure 19: Congestion window behaviors. ....................................................................... 53 
Figure 20: Incorrect window estimates based on incorrect RTT boundary. .................... 54 
Figure 21: RTT estimator – uniform sampling ................................................................ 56 
 ix 
 
Figure 22: Network topology of RTT estimation. ............................................................ 58 
Figure 23: Spectrum of two TCP flows. .......................................................................... 59 
Figure 24: RTT estimates and real RTTs. ........................................................................ 60 
Figure 25: A prototype architecture of the Lomb-based RTT estimation system. ........... 63 
Figure 26: Lomb periodgrams. ......................................................................................... 65 
Figure 27: Lomb-based RTT estimates for a trace. .......................................................... 67 
Figure 28: RMSE of RTT for 10 of 50 simulated TCP flows. ......................................... 69 
Figure 29: Perr for 10 of 50 simulated TCP flows. .......................................................... 69 
Figure 30: Two types of cwnd estimation errors .............................................................. 70 
Figure 31: Cwnd estimation based on sliding window .................................................... 72 
Figure 32: Detection of the flow behavior based on CUSUM banks ............................... 81 
Figure 33: TCP-Reno finite state machine ....................................................................... 84 
Figure 34: Network topology of experiments .................................................................. 86 
Figure 35: Cwnd estimates of TCP Reno flows ............................................................... 87 
Figure 36: State transition diagram .................................................................................. 88 
Figure 37: Count of ATC and NTC ................................................................................. 89 
Figure 38: Ratio of ATC to NTC ..................................................................................... 89 
Figure 39: Detection rate versus ratio threshold. ............................................................. 90 
Figure 40: Virtual congestion window estimates of UDP ................................................ 91 
Figure 41: Classification of TCP-Reno and non-Reno flows based on the ratio of ETC 
to RTC. ........................................................................................................... 92 
Figure 42: Congestion windows of 5 TCP-Vegas flows: (a) estimated states, and (b) 
actual states. ................................................................................................... 94 
Figure 43: Classification of two different TCP flavors .................................................... 95 
Figure 44: Estimates of congestion windows. .................................................................. 97 
 x 
 
Figure 45: Classification in mixed flow types ................................................................. 98 
Figure 46: Cwnd dynamics of different flow types .......................................................... 99 
Figure 47: Simple TCP-Vegas FSM .............................................................................. 101 
Figure 48: Detection outcome based on Vegas FSM ..................................................... 101 
 
 xi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 Page 
Table 1: The relationship between 𝐻𝐹𝐼
𝐴 , M, and linked lists. ............................................ 42 
Table 2: Hit ratio increased by handling different prefixes. ............................................ 43 
Table 3: Equation symbols. .............................................................................................. 51 
Table 4: State definition ................................................................................................... 78 
Table 5: Gradient-based behavior metrics........................................................................ 80 
Table 6: Behavior metrics of CUSUM detectors ............................................................. 82 
Table 7: Parameters of CUSUM banks ............................................................................ 83 
Table 8: Mean and variance of ratio of ATC to NTC ...................................................... 96 
Table 9: Ratio of ATC to NTC for 50 flows .................................................................. 100 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF TECHNICAL CHALLENGES 
 
The Internet is a globally shared resource; its quality of service relies on 
voluntary cooperation of users. Non-cooperative access of the Internet can cause serious 
degradation of service quality to some or whole user communities. This dissertation 
addresses some of the key issues that affect the operations of an enterprise network, 
which is defined as a network whose users share certain common goals and the network 
manager has the authority to care for the wellbeing of users. This dissertation aims to 
address two issues: (a) how to detect voluminous packet contents sent into the enterprise 
network, and (b) how to detect selfish users who aggressively consume bandwidth, even 
in the face of network congestion. Both issues are related to capturing the dynamics of 
network traffic, where the former is at the level of message contents, and the latter is at 
packet flows.  Both are involved with labeling network connections as being “normal” or 
“anomalous”, as their packets flow through. To attack this problem, it is necessary to 
explore the complex relationship between the computing complexity of the problem, 
resource constraints, underlying characteristics of the normal vs. anomalous traffic, and 
eventually the computing and architectural designs. These key issues are highlighted 
next.  
An enterprise gateway is a converging point of both ingress and egress Internet 
traffic. It is an ideal location to perform enterprise wide management of Internet traffic, 
especially the proposed network security solutions for detection of anomalous contents 
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and anomalous traffic flows. Given that a gateway does not have access to hosts, it does 
not have access to most operational parameters of Internet traffic. As such, several 
fundamental challenges need to be addressed for detection of anomalous contents and 
anomalous traffic flows. These challenges are summarized below.  
Four key challenges for real-time sensing and detection of UNE:  
(1) Memory size and processing costs:  
It takes tens or hundreds times more cycles and memory space to process a 
packet than to transmit the packet. The situation worsens as the transmission 
bandwidth continues to grow, yet no significant breakthrough is at sight for 
processor speed or memory density. Decreasing the computing complexity of the 
processing algorithm is the first and foremost important requirement for content 
analysis.    
(2) Signature based solutions are ineffective for new UNE:  
Signature-based detection approach requires generation of the detection signature 
extracted from confirmed attacks. The long delay in this model makes traditional 
detection tools ineffective in capturing new UNE.    
(3) Computing complexity of the detection system: 
Any clues being used for detection of UNE need to be buffered, until a decision 
can be made to confirm or reject the presence of UNE. The time and storage 
complexity of algorithms to update those clues are critical to detection 
performance.    
(4) UNE behavior modeling: 
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Given a fixed amount of resources, an UNE detection system needs allocate 
resources to detect current UNE while releasing resources allocated to handling 
of stale UNE. The goal is to maximize the detection rate given an acceptable 
false alarm. 
Major challenges for the detection of non-cooperative packet flows are 
summarized as follows: 
(1) Determining the behavior that can represent different flows:  
The flow behavior can be represented by various forms. It is important to define 
effective features to distinguish well-defined and anomalous TCP flows.    
(2) Detecting non-cooperative flows in transient states:  
A steady state based modeling technique cannot timely identify  anomalous 
flows. In addition, parameters of these models cannot be easily measured. 
(3) Low/high pass filters have limited effects:  
Behavior states have different characteristics. Some change slowly, while others 
change rapidly. When a large number of these hidden behavioral processes are 
interleaved at a gateway the decision process of detecting non-cooperative flows 
based on classical filters can become intractable.   
(4) Rapid flow parameter changes with noisy background traffic: 
Parameters of TCP flows such as RTT and Cwnd change dynamically in 
response to the level of network congestion. How to determine these parameters 
that are not explicit parts of packets is very challenging. The challenge is further 
escalated with loss and retransmission of packets.   
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All of these problems listed above have not been fully solved in the literature. As 
it will become clear later in the rest of this dissertation, none of these problems can be 
effectively solved by straightforward, intuitive techniques. Rather, sound system 
modeling and efficient algorithms are required to characterize their patterns, and on-line 
algorithms to capture them. 
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CHAPTER II  
DETECTION OF CONTENT ANOMALY 
 
2.1 Background 
For enterprise networks, the ingress Network Access Point (NAP) is a 
concentration point of unsolicited electronic messages (UNE) before they are dispersed 
to users. A major advantage of detecting UNE at the NAP is that it provides the largest 
number of UNE samples at a single point. Real-time filtering of the UNE must avoid 
adding significant delay to delivery of regular messages. False positive alarms should be 
minimized to avoid dropping legitimate messages. The memory and computing time 
requirement need to be bounded in order to handle the large volume of messages. 
The anomalous contents not only consume enterprise resources but also 
jeopardize personal data. Rapid, frequent changes of message contents are a highly 
effective way for attackers to evade security software, regardless of their sophisticated 
designs based on information theory, machine learning, and statistics. Driven by profit 
making, anomalous message distributors continue to launch enormous amounts of 
malicious messages that flood enterprise networks, consuming network resources and 
posing a severe threat to the credibility of legitimate message communications. Taking a 
hit and run, highly mobile message delivery and (victim) harvesting strategy, educated 
anomalous message distributors routinely defeat message filters that rely on trained 
signatures. We argue that a critical missing link of existing network security 
management tools is their ability in real-time sensing and classifying of UNE signatures, 
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so that the countermeasures can be deployed proactively before the attack spreads too 
widely to be manageable.  
In this dissertation, we propose a real-time anomaly detector called Progressive 
Electronic-Message Classifier (PEC) [1] for early detection of UNE before they spread 
into the local networks. To meet the performance challenges, an O(1) spinning wheel 
algorithm is developed for the aging-scoring function. In addition, a mathematical model 
is created to derive system parameters such as the score threshold and age table size 
given the specific detection latency and successful probability.  
PEC detects UNE based on their self-similarity property, which refers to an 
unusually large number of identical/similar message structures and/or contents such as 
the URL links, message structures, or the last few SMTP relay hops, etc. that can 
effectively identify the onset of a wave of UNE that were freshly crafted in a new format 
and sent from some unknown sources. PEC can be used as a behavior based filter alone, 
or as needed, it can be interfaced to existing anti-spamming tools so that message 
samples that trigger the anomaly detectors could be further examined. 
Unlike most commercial spamming filters based on statistics or pattern training, 
PEC detects surging of feature instances in predefined features without prior training. A 
feature can be any data type, e.g., html statements like URL links or IMG sources, 
sender sources, etc., that represent invariant characteristics of UNE. Message 
components not defined by the detection features are considered variants of the UNE 
that would be ignored by PEC. On the basis of an O(1) spinning wheel algorithm to keep 
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track of feature instances, the core detection engine of PEC can also be used in other 
protocol layers for real-time anomaly detection without prior training. 
An experimental prototype of PEC integrated to sendmail is implemented for 
detection of URL links of UNE, albeit the system can be easily expanded to filter other 
features. URL links extracted from the corpus of spamming-phishing messages are used 
to generate UNE, which are then mixed with regular messages to test the prototype. To 
meet the performance challenges, an O(1) spinning wheel algorithm is developed for the 
aging-scoring function. Experimental results on a Xeon based server show that PEC can 
handle 1.2M score updates, hashing and matching of 7k URL links, and parsing of 200 
messages bodies of average size 1.5kB. The lossy detection system can be easily scaled 
up and down by progressive selection of detection features and detection thresholds. It 
can be used alone or as an early screening tool for existing infrastructure to defeat major 
UNE flooding. 
 
2.2 Existing Solutions 
Significant progress has been made in the areas of host or local message server 
protection: virus protection (McAfee, Trend, Symantec), host intrusion detection 
systems [2][3], system quarantine efforts, user-agent spam filtering, and even policy 
requirements for system  matches  [4]. Admittedly,  there  are a  number of  techniques 
designed to detect UNE, but the adversary  has a  broad spectrum of tricks and means to 
deceive. The adversary is always a step ahead.  
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Some of the most noted systems include intrusion detection systems (IDS), 
antivirus and anti-spammer software systems that rely on string matching and parsing to 
capture known attack patterns. Popular IDS software, such as L7-filter [5], Snort, and 
Bro, parse and match patterns (attack vectors) as a component of their finite state 
machines (DFA or NFA) to represent patterns. Thus, they require accelerated parsing, an 
active research area, e.g., grouping of patterns [6], and multiple regular expressions 
matching [7]. The exponential growth in memory space consumption in these classical 
algorithms suggests that they are more suitable for detailed inspection of messages. 
Commercial tools can be used sparsely for detailed analysis of a small number of 
messages, but the computing cost is too high to use them for inspection of every 
message at wire speed. We will focus on algorithm aspects for an overall system solution 
in the current study. Hardware solutions [8][9] will not be considered. 
A myriad of solutions have been crafted to filter messages. Approaches range 
from a simple policy to only accept messages from known senders, to those based on 
Bayesian inference based on statistical key word matching. Black/white lists are based 
on sharing of the databases of known good and bad sources. The computationally 
feasible puzzles technique developed decades ago is being revisited as a rate limiting 
technique to deter spam [10]. Black lists (SpamCop, Sorbs, etc.) of spamming sources 
and phishing web sites are being tracked by organizations [11][12]. Among other 
measures, global message providers adopt source authentication.  Gmail and Yahoo both 
adopted the DomainKeys technology, which aims to detect spoofing senders by using 
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encrypted tags to be compared with a shared or public database of active spamming 
Internet addresses [13]. 
Spamassassin [14] filters spamming messages based on a compound scoring 
system calculated from  Bayesian statistics, DNS and URL black lists, and  various spam 
databases. Implemented in Perl, [15] it is not designed for line-speed inspection. PILFER 
[16] uses ten features e.g., IP-based URLs, non-matching URLs, JavaScript, etc. to 
detect phishing frauds. The features were generated using off-line SVM. Spamato [17] is 
another popular spam filter, which provides an extendable interface to support plug-ins 
of third-party filters and makes score decisions using the filter outcomes. Currently it 
supports Vipul’s Razor Filter [18] (blacklisted domain name look up), Earl Grey Filter 
[19], etc. Dominator [20] is also a URL-based filter, which uses “URL+spam” or 
“URL+blacklist” as the keyword to inquire Google for the likelihood of spamming. 
SpamGuru [21] supports user voting through Lotus Notes mail clients to handle 
black/white lists. A pipelined-based architecture allows multiple filers cascaded together 
to perform analysis of a message until it can be declared a spam or otherwise. 
The sophisticated computations in content analysis based filters limit them to non 
real-time environments. On the other hand, PEC is designed as a line-speed detector to 
capture surges of new feature instances in messages. It should not come as a surprise to 
see integration of the two classes of detectors in different ways. For instance, PEC can 
use existing tools to determine the likelihood of spamming by a newly detected surge of 
a feature instances at the ingress of the enterprise network. Or, PEC can publish the 
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score results so that existing spam filters can use the published list to adjust their score 
weights at servers or desktops. 
Behavior profiling is a viable technique to differentiate normal vs. anomalous 
patterns of messages [22] and other general usage [23][24][25] based on usage 
frequency, social cliques, and interactions. Selection of the distance function needs to be 
done based on the nature of detection features [26]. The n-gram analysis technique has 
been used to detect malicious code execution and anomalous message generation 
patterns.  Behavior patterns could be measured by distance functions. They can range 
from simple bit by bit comparison (Hamming distance) to information theoretic 
measures (e.g., Kullback-Leibler test). A general distance function is ‖𝐱 − 𝐲‖𝐩/𝐫 =
�∑ |𝐱𝐢 − 𝐲𝐢|𝐩𝐃𝐢=𝟏 �𝟏/𝐫 [27], where x and y are feature vectors, p-weight on dimension 
dissimilarity, and r the distance growth of patterns.  Selection of the distance function 
needs to be done based on the nature of detection features (numerical vs. string, point 
observations vs. multivariate inputs, time window size and sampling methods, etc.) The 
ultimate judgment on selection of detection features and their distance functions needs to 
be based on their detection performance on the real data.   
Spamming messages can also be viewed as a type of heavy hitters of network 
traffic. However, despite the similar nature between PEC and these network heavy hitter 
detectors, they operate on entirely different premises because PEC is a point detector but 
its counterparts are for Internet wide analysis. Hierarchical aggregation and computation 
of multi-dimensional data (IP address, port number, and protocol fields of IP flows, etc) 
have been extensively investigated, e.g., [28][29], where a heavy hitter is essentially 
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traffic flow whose volume, which is computed from the hierarchical data structure, 
exceeds a certain threshold. Once detected, one could even locate the source via a high 
dimensional key space. A deterministic sampling technique called lossy counting (LC) 
[30] was proposed to detect heavy hitters with bounded errors. The sketch-based 
approach [31] used a small amount of memory to detect anomalous traffic. Based on it, a 
reverse hash method [32] is used to identify the keys of culprit flows without extra 
recording memory. 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) and antivirus software systems also rely on 
string matching and parsing to capture known attack patterns. Popular IDS software, 
such as L7-filter [5], Snort [1], and Bro [3], parse and match patterns (attack vectors) as 
a component of their finite state machines (DFA or NFA) to represent patterns. 
Hardware and software based parsing acceleration [6][7][8][9][27] is a highly active 
research area. 
Yet, there is no solution to address UNE at the entrance points of an enterprise 
network. It is likely that these approaches and other statistical similarity functions, in 
their original forms, would have limited use for on-line detection because of their high 
computing complexity. Thus, the motivation behind this research is to devise a new form 
of computer network defense to protect military networks from threats posed by 
seemingly innocent UNE. We will focus on fast algorithms tailored for detecting the 
onset of structural or content similarity (word count and number of URL links, image 
rendering sources, etc) of buffered messages in a time window, so that the content 
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similarity can be extracted by a higher-level of analysis and can configure UNE 
detectors on the fly. 
 
2.3 PEC System Architecture 
PEC is designed to detect anomalous surges of feature instances (FI) of major 
UNE flooding. An FI is a particular realization of the UNE feature F, which is any 
message construct that is likely to be used by spammers. From the viewpoint of system 
event management, each detected FI represents one feature clock (FC) that drives all 
state updates. To operate in a broadband environment, the detection process in PEC is 
made dynamic and lossy, i.e., some messages may pass the (overloaded) detector 
without being checked in order to avoid adverse performance effects due to any type of 
resource contention.  
Let F = { α1,  α2,  α3  …, } represent a set of binary strings which can be 
expressed and parsed by a finite automata, and αi of F is an FI of F. A message construct 
is not a viable UNE feature if it cannot be effectively used to discriminate regular 
messages from UNE, e.g., the greeting words, subject line, etc. As of the writing of this 
dissertation, key words/phrases (“click here”, “getting rich”), deceptive URL links, or 
remotely rendered images are the most prevalent UNE features. The detection features 
can be added/removed (“progressive”) based on resource constraints and user 
requirements. 
Let γ denote a newly identified FI by PEC, γ is assigned one of three states: Xγ 
← G/B/W, i.e., Gray (unchecked), Black (UNE), or White (not UNE), until it is removed 
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from the system.  Xγ (v) ← G, where v is the current FC value. γ will be retained for a 
certain time period before its state changes, i.e., Xγ←W/B.  Xγ ← B (from G) if the 
number of its occurrences, called score, Rγ exceeds a score threshold, S, but Xγ ← W if 
its age, Aγ, exceeds an age threshold, M, the age of γ is the time elapsed before its score 
is increased. S and M are two major design parameters that decide the detection 
sensitivity and false alarm rates of the system.  
Hotlist
Graylist 
Cache
UNE
Database
New UNE
Addition
Expired UNE
Removal
Parser
Hash
Blacklist 
Checking
Scoring Aging
Spinning Wheel Algorithm 
Score Table Age Table
Report
Queue UNE
Reporting
Graylist
Queue
Inspection
Queue
X-mark
Queue
SMTP
Receiver
SMTP
Sender
Message 
Queue
 Blacklist Scoreboard
 
Figure 1: PEC architecture. 
 
Referring to Figure 1, we propose a cascaded filter architecture consisting of a 
blacklist and scoreboard to track FIs.  Messages being filtered are parsed for FIs by the 
feature parser(s) in the blacklist module. After an FI γ is extracted and hashed to Hγ,  Hγ 
is checked against the hotlist, which is the hash vector of currently active FIs in some 
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UNE. If a hit occurs to Hγ on the hotlist, it means that γ is an UNE instance, and the 
SMTP server could take countermeasure action, e.g., X-mark the (UNE) message 
through the X-mark queue, or simply increase its hit count. Otherwise, (γ, Hγ) is placed 
on the graylist cache, and Hγ is placed on the graylist queue of the scoreboard for further 
tracking.   
The hotlist is a single bit array with all or a part of Hγ as its table address.  The 
graylist cache serves as a temporary lookup table between FI and HFI. (γ, Hγ) is moved 
into the UNE database once it appears on the report queue, i.e., Rγ was found to exceed 
S by the scoreboard. Or, (γ, Hγ) is simply removed from the cache when Aγ exceeds M. 
The average life span of UNE feature instances is short.  As such, a background thread 
periodically examines the UNE database so that the FI can be removed when it becomes 
cold. 
Hγ passed from the blacklist to the scoreboard is tracked by scoring and aging 
functions based on a competitive aging-scoring scheme (CASS). Each FI that does not 
hit the blacklist but enters the scoreboard generates a virtual clock (VC) which triggers 
all of the state transitions. In the rest of the discussions we will use v to denote the 
current VC value, unless explicitly defined otherwise. 
If Hγ is new, it is placed into the score table (ST) and its score Rγ ← 1, and age 
Aγ ← 0 (in the age table (AT)). Otherwise, if Hγ is already in ST, Rγ is incremented and 
Aγ ← 0. Three types of operations are interlocked in each VC: increase of Rγ, rest of 
Aγ, and increase of Aβ, β ≠ γ. An FI that does not have its score increased for a 
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consecutive number of VCs is eliminated from the ST, i.e., XFI ←W and FI is not an 
UNE feature. CASS is summarized as follows.   
R1. If Hγ (or equivalently γ), is already in the scoreboard, then Rγ increments, 
and Aγ ← 0. Otherwise, insert it into the ST with Rγ ← 1, and also into the AT with Aγ 
← 0. An old entry Hτ in ST and AT may need to be removed from the scoreboard, i.e. 
Xτ ← W, if Aγ > M happens to occur at the same VC.   
R2. Aβ increments and Rβ unchanged, where β ≠ γ,  
R3. Report Hγ to blacklist if Rγ > S; remove Hγ from scoreboard after reporting.   
A critical design goal of CASS is to reduce the O(N) computing cost in age 
increment of a naïve implementation to O(1). To solve this problem, we propose a 
spinning wheel algorithm to keep track of ages of entries by modeling AT into a cyclic 
queue, and using the queue location of an entry to represent its age. This way, the 
scoring (of γ) and aging operations, i.e., steps R1-R3, of all entries in AT can be 
collapsed into a few fixed computing cycles, independent of the sizes of AT and ST.   
Different hash functions can be used for H. For simplicity and computing speed, 
we adopt the SDBM hash function [33] for PEC. Hash collision is inevitable, but this 
problem can be remedied by adding a further step of exact string matching or additional 
hashing. To keep our current discussion focused on the system architecture, we will 
address the hash management issue in the future. 
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2.4 Low Computing Cost Algorithm  
2.4.1 Scoring Function 
Similar to the hotlist, the score table (ST) could use the hash values of FIs as its 
address directly when a large number of FIs need to be tracked. Given that FIs would 
only stay in the scoreboard for a relatively short time before they are classified as UNE 
(B) or normal (W), we propose to only use a fraction of the hash value to implement ST 
based on a pointer table and linked lists, such as the data structure illustrated in Figure 2. 
Here, each linked node consists of a score, AT-index, and stamp. The score field keeps 
track of Rγ. The AT-index field points to the AT location of Hγ in the AT, L, and ATL 
← Hγ if Hγ is a new FI so that a reverse look up can be made from any AT location of 
its associated linked node through the pointer table. The stamp is derived from a fraction 
of Hγ bits as follows. 
When an entry Hγ in the graylist queue is being processed by the scoreboard, Hγ 
is divided into two parts, 𝐇𝛄
𝐀 and 𝐇𝛄
𝐂, respectively, where 𝐇𝛄
𝐀 serves as the address of a 
pointer table entry, which points to a linked node N, and then 𝐇𝛄
𝐂, is checked against the 
stamp field of N. If a hit in ST occurs to Hγ, its score Rγ is incremented, and if Rγ 
becomes larger than S, Hγ is sent to the report queue (to the blacklist), and its entries in 
both AT and ST are nullified. All nodes linked to N may need to be checked until a hit 
occurs, or a new node will be created for Hγ. By passing L to the aging function, we can 
adjust the ages of all entries in the AT. We note that any of the k bits in Hγ can be 
assigned to 𝐇𝛄
𝐀 , but experiments show that using the lowest order bits tends to have 
lower collision ratios (or shallower linked lists). 
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CHγ
AHγ RγAHγ
CHγ
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Figure 2: Score table and age table. 
 
2.4.2 Aging Function 
The aging function manages the ages of FIs in the scoreboard by modeling AT 
into a cyclic queue (CQ), where the CQ position of Hγ represents its relative age among 
all entries in the scoreboard: Let the head and tail of CQ be denoted as 𝐂𝐐𝐃 and 𝐂𝐐𝐓, 
respectively. The age of Hγ is smaller than that of Hβ if it is positioned closer to 𝐂𝐐𝐃 
than 𝐇𝛃 is. For a CQ entry placed at the 𝐀𝐓𝐢, its (next) adjacent queue entry is located at 
𝐀𝐓(𝐢+𝟏 𝐦𝐨𝐝 𝐌), where M is the table size, and 𝐀𝐓𝟎 is the first array location. 
Recall that scoring of one FI also implies aging of all other entries. To age all 
other FIs in the scoreboard at the lowest cost, first we make the age threshold M, also the 
size of AT, and we move 𝐂𝐐𝐃 from its current location in AT to that of 𝐂𝐐𝐓 at each VC. 
The notion of “spinning wheel” is attributed to shifting of the new 𝐂𝐐𝐃 to that of the 
existing 𝐂𝐐𝐓, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The spinning wheel algorithm in a CQ. 
 
The entry Hγ retrieved from the graylist queue into the scoreboard is placed at 
the new 𝐂𝐐𝐃 position (in addition to proper ST updates) because it is made the 
“youngest” entry in scoreboard by CASS rules. Now that M is both the size of AT and 
the age threshold, a non-null 𝐇𝛃, 𝐇𝛃 ≠ 𝐇𝛄, located at the (existing) 𝐂𝐐𝐓 is the only 
entry whose age is to exceed M. As a result, these few actions required to realize R1, R2 
and R3 can be computed in a few fixed steps, regardless of the value of M. Of course, 
entries of ST and AT for both 𝐇𝛃 and 𝐇𝛄 need to be updated to maintain the overall 
consistency. It is trivial to prove that the computing complexity of the spinning 
algorithm is O(1). 
In summary, AT entries need to be adjusted in the current VC after the aging 
function receives a request from the scoring function to handle Hγ based on three cases: 
(1) Rγ = 1, (2) 1< Rγ ≤S, (3) Rγ = S+1. In case (1), γ is a brand new FI and therefore , 
shift the AT location of the new CQD to that of the existing CQT. Then write Hγ into the 
new CQD location. In case (2), γ is already in the scoreboard, but Rγ is not high enough 
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to be considered UNE. Four steps are needed for this case: Step (a) use the AT-index of 
𝐇𝛄 in ST to locate the AT table address of 𝐇𝛄 and nullify its content. Step (b) change the 
AT location of the new 𝐂𝐐𝐃 to that of the existing 𝐂𝐐𝐓. Step (c) copy 𝐇𝛄 into the new 
𝐂𝐐𝐃 location. Step (d) copy the new 𝐂𝐐𝐃 location back to the AT-index field of the 𝐇𝛄 
node in the ST. In case (3), 𝐑𝛄 exceeds the score threshold and needs to be passed to the 
blacklist. We nullify the AT entry of 𝐇𝛄, (erase the 𝐇𝛄 node in ST), and shift and move 
the location of the new 𝐂𝐐𝐃 to that of the existing 𝐂𝐐𝐓 as usual. Of course, any non-null 
entry 𝐇𝛃 in the existing 𝐂𝐐𝐓 needs to be purged from the scoreboard. 
The interlocked operations between the scoring and aging functions are 
illustrated through Figure 4 consisting of three FIs: α, β and γ. The states of each FI are 
tracked by its score and age. Its state (W/G/B) is marked by very light, gray and solid 
black horizontal line segments. The event that triggers the state of an FI to change is 
marked by the arrowed curves. The arrival of an FI represents one VC tick. For ease of 
presentation, we draw the 𝐑𝐅𝐈 and 𝐀𝐅𝐈 in positive and negative Y directions, 
respectively. Note that VCs are not uniformly distributed on the real time line in this 
example. 
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Figure 4: An illustration of aging-scoring processes in CASS. 
 
2.5 Modeling of the PEC Behavior 
Any FI will stay in the scoreboard for a finite amount of time before it is purged 
with its state labeled as B/W. The sojourn time for a normal FI is simply M counts of 
VCs, but it is not as obvious in determining that of an UNE FI, i.e., the detection latency. 
Instead of full assessment of detection, sensitivity and selectivity in the classical sense 
which would require extensive field experiments, we propose to investigate the 
relationship between the detection latency (time elapsed before UNE are placed in the 
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blacklist) and the two key parameters M and S. That is, our goal is to answer the 
following two questions. 
Q1:  “What is the minimum value of M to detect an UNE attack (of known density) 
with a success probability of higher than α?” 
Q2:  “For a given M, what is the maximum value of S to guarantee that a probability 
measure P( detection latency < ς ) > α ?” 
Scoring and aging of FIs in the CASS constitute a competition process among 
FIs in the scoreboard. To answer the aforementioned questions, we only consider a 
single UNE source condition here. It will become clear from simulations that this 
represents a worse case scenario than multi-UNE source cases when input rates are 
fixed. 
Answer to Q1: 
Let foreground and background events, 𝐄𝐟 and 𝐄𝐛 denote UNE and normal 
traffic, whose average rates are 𝛍𝐟 and 𝛍𝐛, respectively. Without loss of generality, we 
assume that 𝛍𝐛 > 𝛍𝐟. Recall that the arrival of each FI represents a VC tick; let λ denote 
the mean rate measured by instances of 𝐄𝐟/𝐕𝐂, then  
𝝀 = 𝝁𝒇
𝝁𝒃 + 𝝁𝒇. (1)  
Given λ , we are interested in determining the relationship between M and α, the 
probability that the instance of 𝐄𝐟 occurs more than once in M VCs. Consider the more 
challenging case of low density UNE detection, i.e., 𝛍𝐟 ≪ 𝛍𝐛, λ can be approximated as 
the rate of a Poisson process {𝐍𝐟(𝛕), 𝛕 ≥ 𝟎}, where 𝐍𝐟(𝛕) is is the number of 𝐄𝐟 
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happening prior to τ VCs. Since an 𝐄𝐟 instance will be purged from the scoreboard if and 
only if 𝐍𝐟(𝐭 + 𝐌) − 𝐍𝐟(𝐭) ≤ 𝟏, then 
𝑷(𝑵𝒇(𝒕 + 𝑴) − 𝑵𝒇(𝒕) ≤ 𝟏) (2) 
is the probability of an 𝑬𝒇 instance expiring in M VCs, i.e.,1−α, where P is the 
probability density function of the Poisson distribution [34], expressed by 
𝑷�𝑵𝒇(𝒕 + 𝑴) − 𝑵𝒇(𝒕) = 𝒏� = 𝒆−𝝀𝒕(𝝀𝚫𝒕)𝒏/𝒏!. (3) 
In addition, the cumulative density function, CDF, of the Poisson distribution is 
𝑷�𝑵𝒇(𝒕 + 𝑴) − 𝑵𝒇(𝒕) = 𝒏� = 𝚪(𝒏 + 𝟏, 𝝀𝚫𝒕)/𝒏! (4) 
where 𝚪 is the incomplete gamma function defined as 𝚪(𝒙, 𝒚) = ∫ 𝒕𝒙−𝟏∞𝒚 𝒆−𝒕𝒅𝒕. Thereby 
given the survival probability α of an 𝑬𝒇 instance and a known λ, M can be computed 
using 
𝚪(𝟐, 𝝀𝑴) = 𝟏 − 𝜶 (5) 
Figure 5 shows a pivoting point located at λM = 5 of the Γ mapping curve. It means that 
the survival probability of an 𝑬𝒇 instance only has a marginal increase after the size of 
AT exceeds 5/λ . 
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Figure 5: The incomplete Γ mapping between λM and 𝟏 − 𝜶. 
 
Answer to Q2: 
Next, we discuss the setting of S in Q2. First, we consider the expected number 
of 𝐄𝐟 instances before it is declared UNE for a given probability value α and S. Let 𝐇𝐤 
denote the number of hits of 𝐄𝐟 until k consecutive effective hits (CEH) occurs, where an 
effective hit of 𝐄𝐟 denotes the scenario that Δt ≤ M, when a new 𝐄𝐟 instance occurs, 
where Δt represents the time interval between two adjacent 𝐄𝐟 instances. That is, the 
score of 𝐄𝐟 does increase for this hit, and it is not kicked out due to aging. If it takes 
𝐇𝐬−𝟏 VCs to obtain S-1 CEH, then either the next time is an effective hit and we have S 
CEH, or it is not an effective hit and the scoring procedure of the 𝐄𝐟 instance must begin 
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anew. For an 𝐄𝐟 instance, its effective hit probability is α, otherwise, 1−α. The expected 
value of 𝐇𝐬 can be expressed as 
𝐄(𝑯𝒔|𝑯𝒔−𝟏) = 𝜶(𝑯𝒔−𝟏 + 𝟏) + (𝟏 − 𝜶)(𝑯𝒔−𝟏 + 𝟏 + 𝐄[𝑯𝒔]) (6) 
i.e. 
𝐄(𝑯𝒔|𝑯𝒔−𝟏) = 𝑯𝒔−𝟏 + 𝟏 + (𝟏 − 𝜶)𝐄[𝑯𝒔] (7) 
Taking expectations on both sides of the preceding yields 
𝐄(𝑯𝒔) = 𝑬(𝑯𝒔−𝟏)/𝜶 + 𝟏/𝜶 (8) 
Since H1, the number of 𝑬𝒇 until the first effective hit, is equal to one, we see that 
𝐄(𝑯𝟏)=1, and recursively 
𝑬(𝑯𝟐) = 𝟐𝜶 , 
𝐄(𝑯𝟑) = 𝟏𝜶 + 𝟐𝜶𝟐 , 
𝐄(𝑯𝟒) = 𝟏𝜶 + 𝟏𝜶𝟐 + 𝟐𝜶𝟑, 
(9) 
and in general, 
𝐄(𝑯𝒔) = 𝟏𝜶  +  𝟏𝜶𝟐 + 𝟏𝜶𝟑 + ⋯ + 𝟏𝜶(𝑺−𝟏) + 𝟐𝜶𝑺  = (𝟏 − 𝟐𝜶−𝑺 + 𝜶−𝑺+𝟏)/(𝜶 − 𝟏) (10) where 𝐄(𝐇𝐬+𝟏) implies the expected number of 𝑬𝒇 instances before it is declared an UNE. With this result, we can determine the detection latency of 𝑬𝒇 in terms of 
physical time. With the probability α, the average detection latency ς expressed in terms of VC is 
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𝛓 = 𝑬(𝑯𝒔+𝟏)/𝝀 (11) Or, when expressed in terms of physical time (seconds), 
𝛓 = 𝑬(𝑯𝒔+𝟏)/𝝁𝒇 (12) 
Example: 
We use the following simple example to demonstrate the setting of M and S 
values for a target detection rate and latency. Here, the average rate of 𝐄𝐟 is 1.5, and that 
of 𝐄𝐛 15.0. Our design goal is to detect 𝐄𝐟 in 520 VCs given the timely detection rate 
(TR) α = 0.96, i.e., the percentage that the actual detection latency is no more than the 
expected latency. 
Since 𝐄𝐟 = 1.5 and 𝐄𝐛 = 15.0, we can thereby get λ = 0.091 using Equation (1). M 
= 55 can be derived by plugging λ = 0.091 and α = 0.96 into Equation (2) such that 
Γ(2,0.091*M) = 0.04. To detect the 𝐄𝐟 instance in 520 VCs, it means that we have 
𝐄(𝐇𝐬+𝟏) = 47.320 by using ς = 520 in Equation (11). To meet the detection latency goal, 
a larger S value is preferred over a smaller one, so that the false positive alarms would 
be lower. By plugging S = 23, 24, and 25 respectively into Equation (10), we can obtain 
𝐄(𝐇𝟐𝟒) = 44.257, 𝐄(𝐇𝟐𝟓) = 47.143, and 𝐄(𝐇𝟐𝟔) = 50.149. As a result, we choose S = 24 
among the three choices because it is the largest S value which can meet the detection 
latency requirement. 
To evaluate the accuracy of the model, we made three major experiments to 
examine (i) the actual detection latency using the model-derived parameters, i.e., S = 24 
and M = 55 , (ii) the TR by varying S while M = 55, and (iii) the TR by varying M but 
bounding S to 24. For each major experiment, we have 10 samples, numbered from 1 to 
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10; each sample is based on 100 runs, and the overall experimental results are plotted in 
Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Detection latency based on S=24, M=55. 
 
From Figure 6 it shows that the average detection latency for each sample is 
around 300 VCs, which is much lower than the model based estimation, 520 VCs. This 
means that in most cases the 𝐄𝐟 instance can be detected in 520 VCs, but in some cases 
the 𝐄𝐟  instance is detected in more than 520 VCs, and it is called the tardy detection rate 
(RR), RR=1-TR. 
Next, we measured the effects of S on TR with the change of S, and the results 
are plotted in Figure 7. Among the different parameter settings, pair (S, M) = (24, 55) 
gives the best experimental fit to the model based estimation of TR, which is 0.96. When 
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S is reduced to 22, TR increases to [0.96, 0.99], and when S is increased to 26, the 
median of its TR becomes 0.94, which is lower than 0.96. 
 
Figure 7: Variation of the detection rate based on M=55 
 
Finally, we measured the effect of M on TR, and the results are plotted in Figure 
8. Both the sojourn time of the 𝐄𝐟 and the detection probability increase with M. When 
M is increased to 57, the mean value of TR (line marked with circle icons) is increased 
to 0.97. When M is reduced to 53, the mean value of TR (line marked with diamond 
icons) is decreased to 0.95. 
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Figure 8: Variation of the detection rate based on S=24. 
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CHAPTER III  
PERFORMANCE OF CONTENT ANOMALY DETECTION 
 
3.1 Experiment Configuration 
A prototype of PEC was developed to evaluate its performance in a 100 Mbps 
local network. The prototype has four elements, as illustrated in Figure 9. PEC and the 
sendmail daemon run on a Dell PowerEdge 1420 with a Xeon 3.0 GHz CPU and 2GB 
memory. The control console and message senders run in Windows XP based PCs. 
The first prototype element is the message generator together with a SMTP client 
to generate regular and UNE messages following the experiment instructions sent from 
the control console. The control console accepts user commands (in XML) to set up 
experiment parameters. It also accepts user commands to set the sizes of the blacklist, 
ST, and AT. The control console also has a graphical interface to display the runtime 
status of PEC, such as the detected UNE, normal messages, utilization ratio of the AT, 
and the full contents of the detected UNE. The third element is the sendmail 8.14.1 
SMTP daemon [35] which runs on a dedicated machine with standard port setup. 
Sendmail can handle up to 20 messages per second in our experiments. 
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Figure 9: Experimental set up of UNE Detection. 
 
The fourth element is the PEC, which is interfaced to the sendmail daemon 
through its standard registration process, so that a set of callback functions are exposed 
to sendmail. Sendmail can also expose basic message structures, i.e., header, message 
body, end of file, etc. to PEC. PEC is implemented in the blacklist and scoreboard 
threads, along with another background thread for UNE retirement of the blacklist. The 
blacklist is interfaced to the Berkeley DB [36] for high level management purposes. The 
table size of the (single bit) hotlist is set at 232 bits, or 512 MB. The sizes of ST, AT, the 
graylist queue and the report queue were changed based on experimental goals. In all 
experiments, the sizes of AT and the graylist cache are set to be M, the age threshold. 
  
31 
 
In this experiment, only URL links are checked by PEC. An X-mark flag is 
inserted to the message header of a message if it has a URL on the blacklist of PEC. An 
UNE batch is generated using a mixture of random text files downloaded from Internet, 
and a spamming URL list (SUL) extracted from the spamming corpus [37]. Subject lines 
and sender names were randomly generated. An UNE specification for an experiment 
run includes the total number of messages and a list of URLs that would be selected 
from SUL to be put into the message body. The user can specify an exact number of 
times that each URL should be used and the range of the message size. 
The main performance criteria include: (1) detection latency (which measures the 
number of messages that passes the system since onset of an UNE wave). (2) The peak 
throughput of the feature parser, blacklist, and scoreboard. (3) The performance impact 
of the queue size between the blacklist and scoreboard. (4) Finally, the impacts of the 
hash function on hotlist collisions, and the tradeoff between detection sensitivity, 
memory size and computing cycles in the scoreboard. 
Figure 10 is a snapshot showing the runtime status of PEC. The four plots 
(starting from left upper corner, clockwise) represent UNE (red, upper half plot)/ regular 
(green, lower half plot) mixture of a sender source, PEC detection states, average score 
of all entries in ST, and AT utilization rate. The time series runs from left to right on the 
screen, i.e., an event at the right side of another occurred at an earlier time instance. 
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Figure 10: A snapshot of the PEC status on the control console. 
 
Figure 11 shows the content of the AT changed when a new FI arrives at the 
scoreboard. In the left part of the figure, the header points to the youngest entry, 
[414738, 3724]. The right part shows that after a new FI [124489, 176] arrives, it 
becomes the youngest one, and the oldest FI [862, 1822] expires and is purged from AT 
and ST. 
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Figure 11: Scoreboard operation. 
 
Next, we measured the detection latencies under different conditions. Let d 
denote the number of UNE messages divided by the number of total messages in one 
experiment observation bin. The expected detection latency is equal to S/d, where 
detection latency is the number of VCs elapsed from the first appearance of an FI until it 
is marked as UNE. Given a d specified by the user, UNE and regular messages are 
randomly placed in the bin. To eliminate potential effects of small age table size, it was 
always set larger than that of the observation bin, so that the relationship between 
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detection latency and other parameters can be characterized. In all experiments, the 
observation bin size was set as 2000, and every reported point was made by taking the 
average of 10 different runs. 
 
3.2 Performance Evaluation 
3.2.1 Detection Latency  
The first experimental result is the relationship between detection latency vs. 
UNE density. The two curves in Figure 12 depict respectively the expected and 
experimental values of detection latencies of a single UNE source at six different 
densities (50, 100, 150, 200 …, 300 UNE/bin). The score threshold is set at 100. As 
expected the detection latency decreases with the UNE density. When only one UNE 
source is considered, a linear relationship between the scoreboard threshold and 
detection latency was observed. 
The scoreboard is designed to detect one UNE instance at a time, and the age of 
every entry is affected by the densities and number of UNE sources. In the next 
experiment, we examined the impact of multiple UNE sources on the detection latency, 
where S=50. Given an UNE source A, six tests were made where one additional UNE 
source is added to the experiment at a time. That is, at test i, UNE A is generated with i 
additional UNE sources. The density of A is fixed at 100 instances per bin, where the bin 
size = 2000, and the density of every remaining UNE source is increased from 50 to 300 
instances/bin. We observe the change of the detection latency of UNE A in the tests, and 
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the results are plotted in Figure 13. The last curve marked as “other sources” is the 
average detection latency of other non-A UNE sources. 
 
 
Figure 12: Detection latency of a single UNE source. 
 
The experimental results suggest that in general, the detection latency decreases 
with the number of concurrent UNE sources. When A has the same density as other 
sources, they have the same detection latency. When A has higher or equal density as 
other sources, i.e., 100 vs. 50 in the first observation point, the detection latency of A is 
close to its expected value, i.e., 1000. The detection latency of A becomes smaller than 
its (single source) expected detection latency with increasing densities of other UNE 
sources. This is because of the vacuum effect of the VCs caused by a detected UNE. 
Once an UNE source is removed from the scoreboard; it will be blocked by the blacklist 
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indefinitely. As a result, densities of all other UNE remaining in the scoreboard are 
increased, and therefore detection latencies are reduced. When the density of non-A 
UNEs is 200 instances/bin, their measured detection latencies are 714 and 496, 
respectively, close to the expected values 700 and 500. 
UNE
 
Figure 13: Detection latency for multiple UNE sources. 
 
In addition to the detection performance, computing cost is another critical issue 
for PEC. For this purpose, we first evaluated different modules (feature parser, blacklist 
checker, and scoreboard) in isolation, and then tested the whole system with all modules 
integrated together. 
 
3.2.2 Throughput of Feature Parser 
The feature parser is benchmarked by message bodies embedded with randomly 
generated URLs. The URL parser is implemented by a light-weight deterministic finite 
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automaton (DFA). The input of the feature parser is the message bodies, whose average 
size is from 1.5 KB to 7.5 KB containing 2 URLs on average. From Figure 14 it shows 
that the processing capability decreases as the size of a message body increases. We did 
not consider MIME parsing because sendmail can separate the header and body from a 
message. 
 
Figure 14: Throughput of feature parser. 
 
3.2.3 Throughput of Blacklist Checking 
Nowadays, URL links can contain much more than a simple domain name 
followed by some path. Therefore it is necessary to evaluate the sustained throughput 
when long and complex scripts are included in the URL. The blacklist is benchmarked 
by randomly generated URLs of a wide range of lengths, and the results are plotted in 
Figure 15. The main operations include the SDBM hash value generation, hotlist lookup, 
and the graylist cache update. The UNE database access is not considered in the 
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benchmark. The results suggest that high speed URL parsing, e.g., 300k to nearly 1M 
links can be parsed by commodity hardware. 
 
 
Figure 15: Throughput of the blacklist checking. 
 
3.2.4 Scoreboard Throughput  
The last, but not least throughput measure is that of the scoreboard. The 
scoreboard is benchmarked by randomly generated 32-bit unsigned integers, and 
experimental results show that it can process 1.2 M requests per second. 
The two threads for blacklist and scoreboard communicate through the graylist 
queue and the report queue. The two threads use the mutex primitive to make mutually 
exclusive access to the graylist queue. As a stress test, one million hash values are 
directly generated by a random number generator and then fed to the blacklist and 
scoreboard to simulate the extreme condition that the STMP, URL parsing and hashing 
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were done in negligible time. Figure 16 depicts the time needed for handling 1 million 
hash values with change of the queue size. The results suggest that when the queue size 
is smaller than a threshold, the processing time would grow rapidly because of rapidly 
increasing overhead for the mutex operations because of inadequate queue sizes. Beyond 
the threshold, the queue length has minimal impact on the throughput. 
 
Figure 16: Scoreboard throughput vs. queue sizes 
 
Increasing the hash length will reduce collisions but it comes at the cost of 
increased memory sizes. In this part of experiments, we investigated the relationship 
between the collisions and table sizes for the hotlist, and the relationship between 
detection sensitivity, sizes of ST and AT tables, and the depths of link lists in the 
scoreboard. 
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3.2.5 Collision Ratio of Black List  
The hotlist is a single-bit table, so that when the hash length is 32 bits long, 512 
MB of memory space suffices. Experimental results show that the collision ratio is very 
close to zero after 1M randomly generated URLs are hashed. The same cannot be said 
when we reduce the hash length, and the experimental results are given in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: The collision ratio in blacklist. 
 
There exists a more complex relationship between detection sensitivity, the sizes 
of AT and ST, score threshold S, and the depths of the linked lists in the ST. For 
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increases. This will lead to longer linked lists in ST. Similarly, increasing of 𝑯𝑭𝑰
𝑨   (for 
the pointer table addressing) should reduce the depths of linked lists in ST. 
To gain a sense of the relationships between these parameters, we conducted a 
series of experiments, where S is fixed at 50. The pointer table size is changed in 
different experimental runs to observe the relationship between M and the depths of 
linked lists. That is, given a pointer table size, the maximum depths of linked lists are 
measured against different M values, and the results are reported in Table 1. In this table, 
the most left column is the bit length of 𝑯𝑭𝑰
𝑨 , which also represents the size of the pointer 
table. For instance, when 𝑯𝑭𝑰
𝑨 = 𝟐𝟎 bits, it means the pointer table has 1M entries. The 
top most rows represents the maximum depth of linked lists in ST, and a table entry 
indexed by the (table size, depth) represents the smallest M value (measured in 
thousands, or k) necessary to observe the said depth in ten experimental runs. For 
instance, if 𝐻𝑭𝑰
𝑨 = 𝟐𝟐 bits, and M = 40k, one can expect the depth of linked lists in ST to 
be one most of the time. But if M = 50k, then the depth of some linked lists would likely 
be 2 or less. 
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Table 1: The relationship between 𝑯𝑭𝑰
𝑨 , M, and linked lists. 
(depth) 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
20 20k 70k 167k 297k 582k 657k 
22 45k 165k 337k    
24 145k 515k     
26 375k      
28 520k      
30 650k      
 
It is observed that spammers often used different URL expressions that point to 
the same web page, e.g., replacing the last string followed by the last “/” by another one. 
Tracking domain names is also a good way to differentiate UNE sources and it can 
significantly increase the hit ratio in the blacklist. However, when two users operate 
within the same domain name such as http://www.geocities.com/user1 and 
http://www.geocities.com/user2, using domain name alone for filtering could lead to 
significant false positive rates. A white list of domain names is needed to solve this 
problem. In this test sample, the number of tested Spammer URLs is 66501, and those 
are all different. Table 2 shows the result of testing how the three ways increase the hit 
ratio. 
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Table 2: Hit ratio increased by handling different prefixes. 
Method Hit Ratio 
Increased 
Example 
Remove the last 
character 
11.9% (1) and (2) 
Remove the string 
after the last “/” 
27.3% (3) and (4) 
Use domain name 61.2% (5) and (6) 
(1)mailshere.biz/profile/41991 
(2)mailshere.biz/profile/41996 
(3)appliancekiosk.geappliances.com/NASApp/ClickThru/ClickThru?q=df-
1kkhQLEGhj6FEsKyiWNXKsRR 
(4)appliancekiosk.geappliances.com/NASApp/ClickThru/ClickThru?q=9b-7-
XFQSIs_-MZdLePIxf09dRR 
(5)www.slammer7piggy.com/?0gQF6VyMLeif0QXXZ 
(6)www.slammer7piggy.com/?dXKwf0tqXJMLeiZ 
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CHAPTER IV  
DETECTION OF PACKET FLOW ANOMALY (ROUND TRIP TIME ESTIMATION) 
 
4.1 Background 
In networks, not all anomalies result from the content. Instead, the anomalies can 
exist in the rate behavior, which is not compliant to specific protocols. For flows 
attempting to gain more bandwidth than others, they do not necessarily follow a well-
defined congestion control protocol. Flows that consume a large fraction of available 
bandwidth could endanger the stability of the Internet, as they frequently give a 
bandwidth load that is inelastic. Therefore it is a serious topic for us to minimize 
potential congestion collapse due to uncontrolled, high rate traffic loads. To maintain 
fair access of the network bandwidth, some techniques such as packet queuing and 
dropping can be applied to filter inelastic flows. However, no matter what kind of filter 
is employed, we still need to know when anomalous flows occur before they can be 
controlled.  
The detection of flows with uncontrolled bandwidth consumption is important to 
cloud service providers such as Amazon EC2 and Microsoft Azure as well as content 
providers who are charged by the amount of the data transfer. Malicious bandwidth 
consumption will result in service providers and operators increasing costs to enhance 
network infrastructure and maintain the certain quality of service of networks.  
In this chapter, I focus on detecting flows not complying with well-defined TCP 
protocols. TCP is a popular protocol in networks to ensure data can be delivered 
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correctly from client to server and avoid traffic congestion. Flows driven by unknown 
TCP protocols may be too aggressive in consuming the bandwidth, and thus endanger 
the stability of the Internet. In an enterprise gateway, two parameters that can be 
observed are the number of packets and inter-packet time. Unlike the TCP source, the 
middle point of networks is unable to know the congestion window (cwnd) size, which 
controls the behavior of flow rates, exactly. Since the cwnd changes every round trip 
time (RTT), accurate RTT estimation is an important step to infer the cwnd by counting 
the number of packets within a RTT. The network environment is noisy,  as packets can 
be lost, delayed and retransmitted. It is challenging to obtain the accurate estimates of 
RTT and cwnd, because estimation errors can build up rapidly.  
Several approaches are studied for obtaining accurate RTT estimates. I proposed 
the EWMA-Lomb-periodogram method to increase the accuracy of RTT estimation. The 
experiment outcomes show that EWMA-Lomb-periodogram is more accurate than the 
DFT filter bank and genuine Lomb-periodogram. EWMA-Lomb-periodogram takes 
unevenly spaced inter packet time as samples and applies the exponential weighted 
moving average to samples to reduce noises before they are fed into Lomb-periodogram. 
Due to the self-clocking property, the frequency resulting from RTT’s will be one of the 
major components in the spectrum. Thus, RTT and cwnd can be estimated later. 
We treat the change of the flow rate as states of the protocol behavior, which can 
be secured through the change of cwnd, i.e. the first order of the cwnd difference. In the 
regular TCP protocol, additive increase (AI) and multiplicative decrease (MD) are two 
major behavior states. Typically, AI is a gradual behavior, but MD occurs instantly. 
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Applying the low-pass filter to cwnd changes increases the risk of not detecting the 
occurrence of MD. On the other hand, the high-pass filter cannot reduce the noise when 
the flow is in the AI state. I defined 8 different behavior states and proposed using 
CUSUM banks to detect the flow behavior. CUSUM is not influenced by a sudden noise 
and its detection sensitivity can be set by the CUSUM parameters. By properly setting 
CUSUM parameters, we can make the CUSUM detection system not only responsive to 
changes but also robust to noises. 
Because TCP protocols define their own state transitions, the states identified by 
CUSUM banks will be fed into the finite state machine (FSM), constructed based on the 
well defined TCP protocol to check whether a transition is legal or not. Recognizing that 
no estimation and detection is perfect, the FSM proposed in this dissertation is lossy and 
an anomaly threshold is used as a reference to count the number of aberrant transitions 
and that of normal transitions. Let R denotes the ratio of the number of aberrant 
transitions to that of normal transitions, experiment outcomes show the flows of 
undefined protocols can be identified based on the R-pattern. Figure 18 lists the 
challenges, solutions and performance criteria of detecting non-cooperative flows in 
networks.    
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Figure 18: Challenges and solutions of anomalous flow detection. 
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4.2 Existing Solution 
Traffic anomalies such as failures and attacks are viewed as commonplace in 
today's computer networks. It is a fundamental part of day-to-day network operations to 
identify, diagnose and treat anomalies in a timely fashion. Without this kind of 
capability, networks are not able to operate efficiently or reliably. [38] utilized wavelet 
filters, a pseudo-spline filter tuned at specific aggregation levels will expose distinct 
characteristics of each class of anomaly to expose the details of both ambient and 
anomalous traffic. [39] adopted an unsupervised machine learning technique to automate 
traffic classification and application identification. Because any node can send any type 
of traffic at any time, [40] dynamically produced hybrid traffic definitions for traffic 
characterization and automatically groups traffic into minimal clusters of conspicuous 
consumption. [41] classified Internet traffic through utilizing supervised machine 
learning based on a Bayesian trained neural network. [42] used the technique of 
observing and identifying patterns of the host behavior at the transport layer with no 
access to packet payload. [43] proposed adaptive NetFlow, to address many 
shortcomings of NetFlow by dynamically adapting the sampling rate to achieve 
robustness without sacrificing accuracy. [44] presented the first large-scale exploration 
of the power of the subspace method which characterizes network-wide anomalies by 
fusing information from flow measurements taken throughout a network. For anomaly 
detection for large scale networks, a Kalman filter can be used to filter out the “normal” 
traffic [45]. Principal component analysis was used to diagnose traffic anomalies [46], to 
accurately detect when a volume anomaly is occurring, and correctly identified the 
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underlying origin-destination flow which is the source of the anomaly. Two 
unsupervised clustering algorithms, namely K-Means and DBSCAN [47] were proposed 
for network traffic classification. The experimental results indicated that DBSCAN 
produces better clusters; although, DBSCAN has lower accuracy compared to K-Means. 
[48] fed hand-classified network data to a supervised Naive Bayes estimator and showed 
it is able to achieve about 65% accuracy on per flow classification.  
Several methods were proposed to deal with bandwidth consumption issues. 
Stabilized RED, SRED [49] was proposed to maintain the flow fairness and also 
identified flows that may be misbehaving, i.e. taking more than their fair share of 
bandwidth. A game theoretic framework [50] was used to detect distributed bandwidth 
attacks with needed sampling rates. Different from above approaches, our goal is to 
classify flows of different protocols based on their elasticity, which is the critical 
concept of this dissertation, with the minimum false rate. 
[51] showed that using feature distributions, anomalies naturally fall into distinct 
and meaningful clusters. These clusters can be used to automatically classify anomalies 
and to uncover new anomaly types. A simple architecture called P4P was proposed in 
[52] to allow more effective cooperative traffic control between applications and 
network providers and thus achieve efficient and fair utilization of Internet network 
resources. [53] proposed a way to detect abrupt changes in the network traffic based on 
change-point detection theory and utilized a threshold of test statistics to achieve a fixed 
rate of false alarms.  
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4.3 Limitation of Statistical Models to Detect  Non-cooperative Flows 
Non-cooperative TCP flows can be modeled from different aspects. One option 
is to model abnormal TCP flows as being selfish, where they do not  reduce  their flow 
rate when the network is congested.. To translate this seemingly simple observation into 
quantified, measurement based assessments for on-line traffic,  we first give some basic 
insights on  the relationship between different parameters in a well know traffic model  
[54]. Here,  given a time interval 𝛕 seconds and normal TCP flow throughput 𝝀� pkts/sec, 
a TCP flow is regarded anomalous if its throughput λ>𝝀�+ 𝛋, where 𝛋 is the excessive 
throughput and 𝝀� as shown in (13) is the long-term steady-state TCP throughput of the 
regular TCP flow.  
𝝀� = 𝐦𝐢𝐧
⎝
⎜
⎛𝐖𝐦𝐚𝐱
𝐑𝐓𝐓
, 𝟏
𝐑𝐓𝐓�
𝟐𝐛𝐩
𝟑 + 𝐓𝟎 𝐦𝐢𝐧 �𝟏, 𝟑 �𝟑𝐛𝐩𝟖 � 𝐩(𝟏 + 𝟑𝟐𝐩𝟐)⎠⎟
⎞
 (13) 
It is straightforward to observe that when  TCP flows unfairly consume the 
network bandwidth,  𝛋 is proportional to 𝛕. However, equation (13) is the mathematical 
model of the TCP throughput in the steady state, but most of its variable values, i.e., 
maximum window size 𝐖𝐦𝐚𝐱, the round trip time 𝐑𝐓𝐓, the bottleneck bandwidth 𝐛 and 
the packet loss probability 𝐩, cannot be  measured at an enterprise gateway for a large 
number of flows.  In addition, the steady state model is incapable of detecting the change 
of transient behaviors timely. Due to aforementioned reasons, the statistical model has 
its limitation for identifying anomalous packet flows.  
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 A good indicator to show the TCP transient behavior is the congestion window, 
cwnd, the parameter that TCP utilizes to avoid the network congestion.  Unfortunately, 
this parameter cannot  obtained from  throughput based measurements of TCP flows at a 
measure point, because it is not any part of Equation (13).  To attack this problem, we 
will divide the traffic flow analysis problem into multiple stages, each of which is 
responsible for acquiring certain parameters, in order to infer TCP flows’ behaviors. To 
facilitate the discussion, we first summarize major terminologies and their symbols in 
Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Equation symbols. 
Symbol Definition 
𝐅𝐢 the i-th flow 
𝐖𝐢(𝐭) congestion window of 𝐅𝐢 at time t 
𝐪(𝐭) bottleneck queue length at time t 
L upper bound of 𝐥(𝐭) 
𝐑𝐓𝐓𝐢(t) round trip time of the flow 𝐅𝐢 at time t 
𝐑𝐢(𝐭) rate of the flow 𝐅𝐢 at time t 
𝐑(𝐭) total incoming packet rate at time t 
𝐍𝐋(t) total number of packets lost at a location.  
𝐏𝐢(𝐭) probability of the packet lose of 𝑭𝒊 at time t 
 
Next, we observe basic challenges in modeling of TCP flow behaviors based on  
packet losses. Mathematically, the number of output packets is equal to that of input 
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packets plus the number of lost packets and remaining usable queue capacity. That is, 
one can have  
𝑵𝑳(𝐭) = 𝐦𝐚𝐱 (𝟎, ∫ (𝐑(𝛕) − 𝐁)𝐝𝛕𝐭+𝚫𝐭𝛕=𝐭 -(L-q(t))) (14) 
By substituting 𝐑(𝛕) = ∑ (𝟏 − 𝐏𝐢(𝛕))𝐖𝐢(𝛕)/𝐑𝐓𝐓𝐢(𝛕)𝐢  into Equation (14), we obtain  
𝑵𝑳(𝐭) = 𝐦𝐚𝐱 (𝟎, ∑ ∫ (𝟏 − 𝑷𝒊(𝝉))𝑾𝒊(𝝉)/𝑹𝑻𝑻𝒊(𝝉) − 𝐁)𝐝𝛕𝐭+𝚫𝐭𝛕=𝐭𝐢 -(L-
q(t))). 
(15) 
To obtain ∑ 𝐖𝐢(𝐭)𝐢 , we need to know the parameters: 𝐑𝐓𝐓𝐢 as well as the number of 
packets lost at the bottleneck and during the transmission. From the aforementioned 
discussion, we conclude that how to make precise, robust estimation on RTT for TCP 
flows at a gateway is the foundation to classification of congestion control behaviors. In 
this discussion, we mainly focus on  congestion control behaviors depicted in Figure 19;    
They are AIAD  (additive increase, additive decrease), MIMD (multiplicative increase, 
multiplicative decrease), AIMD (additive increase, multiplicative decrease), and 
MIAD(multiplicative increase, additive decrease). 
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Figure 19: Congestion window behaviors. 
 
4.4 Round Trip Time (RTT) Estimation 
To infer  𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝𝐢(𝐭) of 𝐅𝐢, one is able to count the number of packets every fixed 
interval. Let 𝐂𝐂 denote the cumulative counter. Then the AI behavior can be identified 
by checking if 𝐂𝐂[𝐧 + 𝟏] − 𝐂𝐂[𝐧] = 𝐍𝟐 assuming the sampling time is exactly equal to 
the N RTTs, where n indexes the sample number. However, this assumption is not true 
because RTTs are variable and the boundary of two RTTs should be identified clearly. 
Hence, if the sampling interval is less than one RTT, then the difference between 
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𝐂𝐂[𝐧 + 𝟏] 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐂𝐂[𝐧] can be negative. In addition, 𝐂𝐂[𝐧 + 𝟏] − 𝐂𝐂[𝐧] = 𝐍𝟐 cannot 
hold if the sampling period cannot correctly respond to the physical 𝐑𝐓𝐓𝐢(t). 
Furthermore, the RTTs of all flows are not identical. It is infeasible to identify all 
packets within the same window just by counting packets in a fixed time interval.  
Figure 20 is an example showing that the incorrect boundary of RTTs can lead to 
incorrect cwnd estimates. In an AI state, the cwnd value will increase by 1 every other 
RTT, i.e. 𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝(𝐑𝐓𝐓𝐢+𝟏) − 𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝(𝐑𝐓𝐓𝐢) = 1 . However, 𝐂𝐂[𝐧 + 𝟏] − 𝐂𝐂[𝐧] ≠ 𝟏 if 
the burst size is overestimated or underestimated in the AI state. Hence, the ituitive 
packet counting without the RTT knowledge will lead to the wrong inference of the TCP 
behavior.    
Underestimated
burst size 2 pkts3 pkts
5 pkts5 pkts
CC[n+1]-CC[n]=-1≠1
CC[n+1]-CC[n]=0≠1
(i+1) th 
burst
i -th 
burst
timep4p3p2p1
(i+2) th 
burst
RTTi RTTi+1 RTTi+2Actual RTT
Overestimated
burst size
AI flow state
 
Figure 20: Incorrect window estimates based on incorrect RTT boundary. 
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In order to obtain the cwnd value, acceptable RTT estimation plays the critical 
role. In the following sections, both DFT and Lomb periodgram are studied to verify the 
accuracy of RTT estimates.   
 
4.5  DFT-based RTT Estimation 
Rather than the CC method, the discrete Fourier transform, DFT, is one of the 
options to capture the frequency of the self-clocking property of TCP flows. The above 
diagram shows a system is designed to obtain the major frequency components and 
derive the round trip time dynamically. L denotes the window size, which is set to 256 
by default. The i-th sampling frequency 𝑭𝒔 is derived by Equation (16), where 𝐈𝐏𝐓𝐤 
means the k-th inter packet time.  
𝑭𝒔(𝒊) = 𝑳/ � 𝑰𝑷𝑻𝒌𝒊+𝑳−𝟏
𝒌=𝒊
 (16) 
Here the sampling intervals in DFT are assumed even though no such of a sampler is 
used to capture IPTs.  Based on Equation (16), the average inter packet time X(n) is 
expressed as 
𝑿(𝒏) = 𝟏/𝑭𝒔(𝒏) (17) 
Figure 21 shows that L samples are fed into the uniform DFT filter banks, of 
which the decimation coefficient is M.  If M=2m, then DFT can be performed by fast 
Fourier Transform (FFT). Given 𝐇(𝐳) is the transfer function of the casual low-pass 
digital filter, then 𝐇𝟎(𝐳) = 𝐇(𝐳) denotes the prototype filter and 𝐇𝐤(𝐳) the k-th band 
filter. Then we have 𝐇𝐤(𝐳)= 𝐇𝟎(𝐳)(𝐳𝐖𝐤), where 𝐖 = 𝐞−𝐣𝟐𝛑/𝐌.  
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Figure 21: RTT estimator – uniform sampling 
 
Let N denote the order of the low pass filter. Given  
 
𝑯(𝒛) = � 𝒛−𝒌𝑬𝒌(𝒛𝑴)𝑴−𝟏
𝒌=𝟎
 (18) 
where 𝑬𝒌(z) is the k-th polyphase component of H(z). The decimated DFT filter bank 
needs 
𝐌
𝟐
𝐥𝐨𝐠𝐌 + 𝐍 multiplers which is much less than NM multipliers for computation. 
The higher order of 𝐄𝐤(𝐳) will lead to the sharper cutoff frequency and higher stopband 
attenuation 
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⎥
⎥
⎤, 
(19) 
 
Equation (19) shows the transfer function of the DFT filter bank is equal to the inverse 
DFT matrix multiplying delayed input signals. The output of the transfer function is the 
spectrum that represents the amplitudes of all frequency components. 
To verify the RTT estimation outcome from DFT, an experiment based on NS2 
is configured as shown in Figure 22, where 50 TCP-Reno flows are set to run in 60 
seconds. The bandwidth and delay for the link 𝐒𝐢 − 𝐎𝟏 and 𝐎𝟐 − 𝐑𝐣 are 10 Mb/s and 10 
ms respectively. For the link 𝐎𝟏 − 𝐎𝟐, its bandwidth is 100Mb/s and delay is 20 ms.  
The sampling frequency is derived based on Eq. (16). The DFT obtains a sequence of 
RTTs by computing the spectrum every 256 input samples.  
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Figure 22: Network topology of RTT estimation. 
 
Figure 23 shows the spectrum of two TCP flows using DFT. In this dissertation, 
the k major frequency components are defined as those with the largest k amplitudes. 
Among major frequencies, the lowest one is selected to compute the estimated RTT 
because the frequency of the TCP self-clocking is lower than that of network noises. In 
the experiment, k is set 3.  
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Figure 23: Spectrum of two TCP flows. 
 
Figure 24 plots the RTT estimates, which are the inverse of the lowest major 
frequency and the real RTTs, which are obtained from the NS2 trace variable rtt_. The 
real RTTs expressed by the green star dynamically change in the range [80 90] ms, 
However, most of RTT estimates represented by the red square are much larger than real 
ones.  
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Figure 24: RTT estimates and real RTTs. 
 
4.6 EWMA Lomb-based RTT Estimation 
Since the inter packet time is not evenly spaced and the boundary of packets of 
two adjacent congestion windows is influenced by network uncertainties such as packet 
loss, queuing dynamics and packet retransmission, it is almost infeasible to identify each 
𝐑𝐢(𝐭) with 100% accuracy to estimate the congestion window size 𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝𝐢(𝐭) as the 
reference of the flow behavior. 
Instead of counting the number of burst packets using the fixed sampling period, 
we recognize the time-varying property of RTT, which is regarded as a constant in most 
TCP models. We employ the Lomb periodogram [54][55][56] to obtain the power 
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spectral density (PSD) estimates directly from irregularly sampled time series such as 
the inter packet time, without resampling, to dynamically estimate uncertain RTT values, 
which are key factors to distinguish two adjacent bursts in the measure point. Packets are 
grouped to a burst if they are sent within the same congestion window. 
Lomb periodogram is an approach used to analyze data with highly irregular 
sampling, especially if there are long stretches without data. Lomb periodogram is better 
than the power spectrum for bottleneck links where there would be a retransmission 
timeout such that the sender has no data to transmit before the timer expires. Given the 
time series {𝐱𝐢} measured at times 𝐭𝐢, 𝐢 = 𝟏, 𝟐 … 𝐧, with mean 𝐱� and standard deviation 
𝛔𝐱, 
 
𝐋(𝛚) = 𝟏/𝟐𝝈𝒙𝟐 ��∑ (𝒙𝒊 − 𝒙�)𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒊 𝝎�𝒕𝒊 − 𝝉(𝝎)��𝟐∑ 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝟐𝒊 𝝎�𝒕𝒊 − 𝝉(𝝎)�
+ �∑ (𝒙𝒊 − 𝒙�) 𝒔𝒊𝒏 𝝎�𝒕𝒊 − 𝝉(𝝎)�𝒊 �𝟐
∑ 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝟐𝒊 𝝎�𝒕𝒊 − 𝝉(𝝎)� � 
(20) 
and 
𝛕(𝛚) = 𝟏
𝟐𝛚
𝐭𝐚𝐧−𝟏
∑ 𝐬𝐢𝐧 𝟐𝛚𝐭𝐢𝐢
∑ 𝐜𝐨𝐬 𝟐𝛚𝐭𝐢𝐢
. (21) 
Here 𝛕(𝛚) is an offset that makes 𝐋(𝛚) invariant to time translation. Therefore, we can 
consider the Lomb periodogram as a method to fit a sinusoid of angular frequency 𝛚 to 
the data [57] based on linear least squares. Hence, for each 𝛚, Equation (20) is 
equivalent to fitting data into the mode 
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𝐱(𝐭)  =  𝐚 𝐜𝐨𝐬(𝛚𝐭)  +  𝐛 𝐬𝐢𝐧(𝛚𝐭),  (22) 
based on the least-square criteria and 𝐋(𝐰) = 𝐚𝟐 + 𝐛𝟐. The algorithm to compute the 
Lomb periodogram makes indirect use of the FFT and requires O(n log n) operations. 
Let 𝐰∗ be the angular frequency that maximizes 𝐋(𝐰) on a suitable grid over the 
interval, then the estimate 𝛉� of the RTT is defined by 
𝛉� = 𝟐𝛑
𝐰∗
,  (23) 
It is common that the measured data points are the sum of a periodic signal and 
independent Gaussian noise. If we are trying to determine the presence of such a 
periodic signal, we want to be able to understand “How significant is a peak in the 
spectrum𝐋(𝛚)?” The null hypothesis in the question is that the data values are 
independent and follow the Gaussian distribution. In other words, null hypothesis here 
means the significance level of any peak in 𝐋(𝐰) that we can see. 
Another nice property of the Lomb normalized periodogram is that the viability 
of the null hypothesis can be tested fairly rigorously [55]. In the case of the null 
hypothesis, 𝐋(𝛚) has an exponential probability distribution with unit mean. Given 𝛚 
and 𝐋(𝛚) = 𝐳 in M independent frequencies, the probability of none values greater than 
z is (𝟏 − 𝐞−𝐳)𝐌 such that 
𝐏(> 𝒛) =  𝟏 − (𝟏 − 𝐞−𝐳)𝑴, (24) 
is the false-alarm probability of the null hypothesis [55]. A small value of P for the false-
alarm probability indicates a highly significant periodic signal. In general M depends on 
the number of frequencies sampled, the number of data points N, and their detailed 
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spacing. If the data points are approximately equally spaced, M is very nearly equal to 
N.  
Figure 25 is the Lomb-based RTT estimation system consisting of several 
components as follows: (1) Sample feeding, (2) EWMA IPT smoothing, (3) Enough 
number of samples, (4) Flow ID dispatching and threshold signaling, (5) Block data 
copy into ring buffer, (6) Run Lomb periodgram algorithm, (7) Retrieve the major 
frequency components and (8) Obtain RTT estimates of each flow. 
 
Compute the IPT for each flow ID
Smooth IPT’s by EWMA
Lomb Thread N
Lomb Thread 2The number of samples reach the threshold
Assign the fid and samples to the task 
queue
Lomb Thread 1
Circular 
buffer
Signal a thread
Block data copy buffer_write buffer_read
Lomb FFT 
Algorithm
Blocked
thread
RTT 
Estimates
 
Figure 25: A prototype architecture of the Lomb-based RTT estimation system. 
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Two key parameters of the Lomb periodogram are oversampling frequency, ofac, 
and high frequency, hifac, are set as 4 and 2, respectively. The number of different 
frequencies 𝐍𝐩 returned by the program is then given by 
𝑵𝒑 = 𝒐𝒇𝒂𝒄 ∗ 𝒉𝒊𝒇𝒂𝒄𝟐 ∗ 𝑵, (25) 
where N is the number of data samples.  
The experimental topology, which consists of 50 source nodes, 2 router nodes, 
and 50 receiver nodes, is the same as in Figure 22. The transmission delay is 10 ms 
between  𝐒𝐢 and  𝐎𝟏, 20 ms between  𝐎𝟏 and 𝐎𝟐, as well as 10 ms between  𝐎𝟐 and 𝐑𝐢, 
where 𝐢 = 𝟏, 𝟐, … , 𝟏𝟎. The bandwidth of all links is set to 5 Mbps except that the link 
𝐎𝟏 − 𝐎𝟐 is 100 Mbps. Each 𝐒𝐢 delivers a TCP-Reno flow to the destination 𝐑𝐢 over the 
patch of 𝐒𝐢 − 𝐎𝟏 − 𝐎𝟐 − 𝐑𝐢. IPT’s of all flows are collected at 𝐎𝟐.  
There exist a large number of noises in the IPT sequence such that the amplitudes 
of noise frequencies are non-neglected in the Lomb-periodogram. To eliminate noises in 
the IPT sequence, an exponentially weighted moving average, EWMA,  𝐈𝐏𝐓𝐞𝐰𝐦𝐚(𝐭 +
𝟏) = (𝟏 − 𝛂) ∗ 𝐈𝐏𝐓𝐞𝐰𝐦𝐚(𝐭) + 𝛂 ∗ 𝐈𝐏𝐓(𝐭) is proposed in this work to filter signals of 
each flow. The EWMA approach is widely adopted in the network congestion control, 
e.g. RFC2988 applies EWMA to compute the smooth RTT. The EWMA-Lomb 
approach leads to more accurate and stable RTT estimation compared to the regular 
Lomb approach. 
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Figure 26: Lomb periodgrams. 
 
Figure 26 shows the snapshot of Lomb periodogram of one of 50 simulated TCP 
flows based on the regular Lomb periodogram and EWMA Lomb periodogram with 
different weighting factors from 𝛂 = 𝟎. 𝟓, 𝛂 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟓 to 𝛂 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟐𝟓. In the diagram, the 
regular Lomb plot cannot generate strong amplitude of the self-clocking frequency, 
12.37 Hz, compared to those of noises. However, EWMA Lomb periodogram tends to 
enhance the major frequency components and suppress noisy components when 𝛂 
becomes smaller. Once the self-clocking frequency is obtained, the estimated RTT is 
therefore equal to the inverse of the self-clocking frequency. Given a Lomb 
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periodogram, the major frequency components are defined as those with largest k 
amplitudes and their false alarm probability is less than a predefined value p. In this 
dissertation, k is set to 3 and p 0.01%. Among major components, the one with the 
lowest frequency is considered related to RTT due to the TCP self-clocking property, 
while other high frequency ones are due to network noises such as packet loss, packet 
retransmission and queuing delay. 
Figure 27 shows RTT estimates of a NS2 trace using Lomb and EWMA Lomb 
approaches respectively. The green marks are real time RTT’s recorded in NS2 and red 
marks are RTT estimates based on the estimation. The real RTT’s are mostly between 80 
ms or 90 ms, except for the simulation time between 0.69 seconds and 2.15 seconds for 
which RTT’s are in between 0.11 and 0.14 seconds.   
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Figure 27: Lomb-based RTT estimates for a trace. 
 
Figure 27 also shows that RTT estimates based on the EWMA-Lomb are 
resistant to the noises and close to the real RTT values. However, the regular Lomb 
method may generate RTT estimates far away from the real one due to the influence of 
high frequency noises. Based on the diagram, most of EWMA Lomb based RTT 
estimates are very close to the real RTTs although a few outliers can still be observed. 
Because no estimation is 100% perfect, we wonder the error rate of RTT estimates based 
on Lomb and EWMA Lomb respectively. 
To understand the estimation error, let root-mean-square error, RMSE, be 
defined as follows 
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𝐑𝐌𝐒𝐄(𝛉�) =  �𝐄[(𝛉� − 𝜽(𝒕))𝟐], (26) 
where 𝛉� is the estimator with respect to the estimated parameter 𝛉. Since the real RTT 
changes dynamically and the number of real RTTs from the trace files is more than that 
of RTT estimates, 𝜽�, the mean of real parameters between two parameter estimates, is 
used instead of 𝜽 in Equation (26). Let 𝐑𝐓𝐓�  denote the RTT estimator, 𝐑𝐓𝐓𝐢 denote the 
i-th RTT estimate at time 𝐭𝐢, and 𝐑𝐓𝐓(𝐭𝐣) the real RTT at time 𝐭𝐣  then 
𝐑𝐌𝐒𝐄�𝐑𝐓𝐓� = �𝐄 ��𝐑𝐓𝐓𝐢 − � 𝐑𝐓𝐓(𝐭)(𝐭𝐢 − 𝐭𝐢−𝟏) 𝐝𝐭𝐭𝐢𝐭=𝐭𝐢−𝟏 �𝟐�, (27) 
In Figure 28, RMSE’s of 10 flows based on EWMA Lomb are smaller than those of pure 
Lomb for the same trace. 
Let 𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐫 denote the error percentage such that 
𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒓 = 𝐄 �𝐚𝐛𝐬(𝛉� − 𝜽�(𝒕))𝜽�(𝒕) � ∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟎, (28) 
Figure 29 shows the 𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐫 of Lomb-based RTT estimates and that of EWMA-Lomb RTT 
estimates for 10 out of 50 TCP flows. The mean of 𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐫 of TCP Reno flows is 24% and 
10% for regular Lomb and EWMA Lomb respectively.  Hence the RTT estimation based 
on the EWMA IPTs can result in acceptable RTT estimation errors. 
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Figure 28: RMSE of RTT for 10 of 50 simulated TCP flows. 
 
 
Figure 29: 𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐫 for 10 of 50 simulated TCP flows. 
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CHAPTER V  
DETECTION OF PACKET FLOW ANOMALY (BEHAVIOR IDENTIFICATION) 
 
5.1 Non-deterministic Periods for Cwnd Adjustments 
If RTTs of a TCP flow 𝐟𝐢 are estimated using the EWMA Lomb periodogram, 
then, in theory, its corresponding ∆𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝(𝐭) can be inferred by counting the number of 
arrival packets during 𝐑𝐓𝐓𝐢. In realty, packets can be lost and retransmitted in any RTT. 
Additionally, there exist RTT estimation errors and unaligned RTT boundaries. There 
are two types of errors that can be regarded as the offset error and the scale error. These 
two errors are sometimes correlated because the accumulated scale error will also lead to 
the offset error.  
time
Cwnd
Real RTT Real RTT
RTT 
EstimateOffset 
Error
RTT 
Estimate
Scale 
Error
packets
 
Figure 30: Two types of cwnd estimation errors 
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Recognizing that the error cannot be completly eliminated, we propose several 
approaches to decrease the influence of errors when we are detecting ∆𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝(𝐭), which 
is an important parameter to determine the protocol behavior. In this chapter, all possible 
behaviors are classified into one of following states, i.e. constant rate (CR), zero rate 
(ZR), additive increase (AI), additive decrease (AD), multiplicative increase (MI), 
multiplicative decrease (MD), and unknown. In fact, a TCP protocol may not only show 
one behavior, but different behaviors according to the network condition, e.g. TCP-Reno 
utilizes the AIMD in the congestion avoidance stage, while MI in the slow start phase. 
The goal is to detect the unknown TCP protocols if a specific behavior pattern is given 
as the ground truth, e.g. if TCP-Reno is used as the ground truth, then all non TCP-Reno 
flows are regarded as unknown. 
 
5.2 Low Pass Filter Approach to Reduce Estimation Errors 
Given a sequence of RTT estimates {θ�j, j=1,2,3,…} and that of IPT time stamps 
{ τk, k=1,2,3,…}, where τk is the time stamp corresponding to IPTk, then the estimate of 
the j-th congestion window 
𝛏𝐣 = 𝐤−𝛏𝐣−𝟏, 𝛏𝟎 = 𝟎 , (29) 
where 𝐤 = 𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐦𝐚𝐱(𝛕𝐤) < ∑ 𝛉�𝐢𝐣𝐢=𝟏 .     
The error of the change of the j-th congestion window estimate  ∆𝛏𝐣 = 𝛏𝐣 − 𝛏𝐣−𝟏, 
is strongly related to 𝛉�𝐣 and 𝛉�𝐣−𝟏. Let 𝛉𝐣 denote the real RTT and follow the lognormal 
distribution, i.e. 𝛉𝐣~𝐋𝐨𝐠𝐍(𝛍, 𝛔𝟐). Assume that 𝛉� is not biased significantly to the 
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expectation of a set of real RTTs, i.e. 𝑬[𝛉�] − 𝐞𝛍+𝛔𝟐 ≈ 𝟎, in a short time interval [ 
∑ 𝛉�𝐢,  ∑ 𝛉�𝐢]𝐣+𝐍𝐢=𝟏𝐣𝐢=𝟏 . Let ∆𝛏���(𝐣, 𝐍) = ∑ ∆𝛏𝐢𝐍𝐣+𝐍𝐢=𝐣 = (𝛏𝐣+𝐍−𝟏 − 𝛏𝐣−𝟏)/𝐍 denote the mean of N 
adjacent estimates of the windows change in [ 𝐭𝐣, 𝐭𝐣+𝐍], where 𝐭𝐣 = ∑ 𝛉�𝐢𝐣𝐢=𝟏  and 𝐍 ≥ 𝟐. 
We also denote  ∆𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝�𝐭𝐣� = 𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝�𝐭𝐣� − 𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝�𝐭𝐣−𝟏� the change of the congestion 
window in two RTTs and ∆𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝����������(𝐣, 𝐍) = ∑ ∆𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝(𝐭𝐢)
𝐍
𝐣+𝐍
𝐢=𝐣  the average change of 
congestion windows in N RTTs. Assuming that the flow is in the additive increase or 
decrease state, the variance of the error between ∆𝛏���(𝐣, 𝐍) and ∆𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝����������(𝐣, 𝐍) will be less 
than that between  ∆𝛏𝐣 and ∆𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝�𝐭𝐣� as proved as follows. 
time
θj-1 θj θj+1
ξj-1 ξj ξj+1
τk
IPTk
τk-1 τk+1 τk+2
ξjξ1 ξ2 ξj+2ξj+1 ξj+N ξj+N+1 ξj+2N
jumping window
sliding window
RTT Estimation based on IPT measurements
Cwnd Estimation based on Sliding Window
 
Figure 31: Cwnd estimation based on sliding window 
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Let 𝛜𝐣 = ∆𝛏𝐣 − ∆𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝�𝐭𝐣� denote the error of the j-th window change estimate, 
we further define 
𝛜�𝐣,𝐍 = ∑ �∆𝛏𝐢 − ∆𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝(𝐭𝐢)�𝐣+𝐍𝐢=𝐣 𝐍 . (30) 
Assume that 𝛜 = {𝛜𝟏, 𝛜𝟐, … , 𝛜𝐣, … } is the i.i.d process and follows the normal distribution 
𝐍(𝟎, 𝛔𝛆𝟐), where 𝛔𝛆𝟐 is finite, then 𝐄�𝛜�𝐣,𝐍� = ∑ (𝐄[∆𝛏𝐢]−𝐄[∆𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝(𝐭𝐢)])𝐣+𝐍𝐢=𝐣 𝐍 = 𝟎 and 
𝒗𝒂𝒓�𝛜�𝐣,𝐍� = �𝟏𝐍�𝟐 𝒗𝒂𝒓 �� 𝛆𝐢𝒋+𝑵𝒊=𝒋 � = 𝛔𝛆𝟐𝑵  , (31) 
Equation (31) indicates that the probability distribution of 𝛜�𝐣,𝐍 is more concentrated 
around its mean than 𝛆𝐣 and the variance of 𝛜�𝐣,𝐍  can be further lower by increasing N.  
 
5.3 Dilemma between Detection Sensitivity and Robustness  
The sliding window method is suitable for the detection of the long term steady 
behavior such as AI state, thus minimizing the influence of noises. On the other hand, it 
may be unable to detect the short-term and abrupt change signals such as the MD state.  
For the multiplicative change, its duration has to not be long for maintaining the proper 
network stability and network utilization.  
If the behavior of the multiplicative change does not occur consecutively, there 
will be no sufficient samples to determine multiplicative change by two adjacent 
congestion windows. Since multiple behavior states may exist in a TCP flow, employing 
the sliding window to an estimated cwnd sequence will smooth the change of the 
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congestion window and thus decrease the probability due to the property of the low-pass 
filter, which is good at detecting the slow change and stable signals.  
Instead of analyzing the flow behavior based on a single smoothed curve, 
multiple state detection modules are proposed to execute simultaneously to provide data 
for a decision-making algorithm to identify the current state. For each state, a dedicated 
detection module is used to track if an anomaly occurs for this state. Then the detection 
outcomes of all detection modules are aggregated and sent to the decision maker such 
that not only the detection capability can be increased based on the competitive scheme, 
but also the noise can be reduced if each state detector also behaves like a low-pass 
filter.  
To consider both detection sensitivity and stability, a system consisting of a set 
of CUSUM banks is proposed to detect the state transition of the flow behaviors. 
 
5.4 Concurrent CUSUM Banks for Cwnd Behavior Detection 
Let 𝐌𝐤 denote the behavior metric indexed by k for the N-jumping window 
sampling, 𝐌𝐤 = 𝐟(𝛏𝐤+𝐍−𝟏, 𝛏𝐤−𝟏). For 𝐌𝐤, it has an expectation value 𝛈 to determine if a 
flow is in a specific behavior state. Consider to detect an AI behavior, we have  𝐌𝐤 =
∆𝛏���(𝐣, 𝐍) = (𝛏𝐤+𝐍−𝟏 − 𝛏𝐤−𝟏)/𝐍 and 𝛈 = 𝟏 ideally.  
As the sampling window moves, a series of 𝐌𝐤 can be obtained as 
{𝐌𝟏, 𝐌𝟐, 𝐌𝟑, … , 𝐌𝛕…}. Our goal is to find a time point 𝛕 such that a flow can be 
determined to be or not to be in the state X. To detect the change point of {𝐌𝐤}, the 
cumulative sum (CUSUM) [58][59][60] algorithm will be employed online. We first 
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assume the flow is in the behavior state X and define 𝐌𝐤 of state X. If the change point 
occurs, we say the flow is not in state X. However, we are unable to say the flow is in 
state X if no change point is detected. Therefore, CUSUM here is used to reject the 
behavior state hypothesis rather than recognizing the initial assumption.  
Let {𝐌𝐤, 𝐤 = 𝟎, 𝟏, 𝟐 ⋯} denote the sequence of behavior measures at time 0, 1, 
2… then we define  
𝐗𝐤 = 𝐌𝐤 − 𝛈, (32) 
as the behavior change measurement. Here {𝐗𝐤} is considered as the stationary random 
process since it is independent of the sampling period and size of the sampling subset. 
To make CUSUM asymptotically optimal for a wide range of Change Point Detection 
problems, {𝐗𝐤} has to satisfy the following two conditions [59]: 
(1) {𝐗𝐤} is 𝛙-mixing, meaning that  
𝛙(𝐬) ≝ 𝐬𝐮𝐩𝐭 ≥ 𝟏 𝐬𝐮𝐩𝐀 ∈ 𝐅𝟏𝐭 , 𝐁 ∈ 𝐅𝐭+𝐬∞
𝐩(𝐀)𝐩(𝐁) ≠ 𝟎 � 𝐏(𝐀𝐁)𝐏(𝐀)𝐏(𝐁) − 𝟏�, 
where 𝐅𝟏
𝐭 is the 𝛔-algebra generated by {𝐗𝟏, 𝐗𝟐, ⋯ 𝐗𝐭} and 𝐅𝐭+𝐬∞   is the 𝛔-algebra 
generated by{𝐗𝐭+𝐬, 𝐗𝐭+𝐬+𝟏, ⋯ }. 𝛙(𝐬) approaches 0 as 𝐬 → ∞ , and 
(2) The marginal distribution of {𝐗𝐤} satisfies 𝐄(𝐞𝐭𝐗𝐤) < ∞, ∃𝐭 > 0. 
 
In practice, the above two conditions are very mild and easily satisfied [60] even by long 
range dependent arrival processes. In the normal condition, we have  
𝐄(𝐗𝐤) = 𝒄 ≪ 𝟏,  (33) 
i.e. 𝒄 is much less than 1 and close to 0. Given 𝒂 the upperbound of 𝒄, let us denote 
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𝑿𝒏� = 𝑿𝒏 − 𝒂, (34) 
then 𝑿𝒏�  will be slightly negative during the normal state and increase significantly when 
an abrupt change takes place. 
If the increase of the mean of 𝐗𝐧�  is lower-bounded by 𝐡 in a specific state, the algorithm 
of detecting the change from the specific state to another state is described as follows 
Let 𝐒𝐧 denote the cumulative sum of 𝐗𝐧�  such that  
𝐒𝐧 = ∑ 𝑿𝒊�𝒏𝒊=𝟏  with 𝐒𝟎 = 𝟎, (35) 
we can denote  𝛍𝐧 the maximum continuous increment of 𝑺𝒏 until time 𝒏 and then 
obtain  
𝛍𝐧 = 𝑺𝒏 − 𝐦𝐢𝐧
𝟏≤𝐤≤𝐧
𝐒𝐤. (36) 
It turns out that 𝛍𝐧 can be expressed as 
�𝛍𝐧 = �𝛍𝐧−𝟏 + 𝑿𝒏�  �+
𝛍𝟎 = 𝟎  . (37) 
A large {𝛍𝐧} is a strong indication of the non expected behavior. Since Equation (37) is 
recurrent and much easier to compute than Equation (36), it will be used to make 
detection decisions. 
Therefore, given a threshold 𝐍, a decision function 𝐝𝐍(𝛍𝐧) can be used to detect 
the state change such that ‘0 ’ means the original state and ‘1’  the change of state occurs 
as follows 
𝐝𝐍(𝛍𝐧) = � 𝟎 𝐢𝐟 𝛍𝐧 < 𝑵𝟏 𝐢𝐟 𝛍𝐧 ≥ 𝑵  . (38) 
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Since the detection time is dependent on the threshold 𝐍, we are also interested 
in their relationships. Let 𝛒𝐍 denote the normalized detection time and 𝐡 the actual 
increase in the mean of {𝐗𝐧�} in an anomaly, we have  
𝛒𝐍  = (𝛕𝐍 − 𝐰)+𝐍 → 𝟏𝐡 − |𝐜 − 𝐚| , (39) 
where 𝛕𝐍 = 𝐢𝐧𝐟 {𝐧: 𝐝𝐍(. ) = 𝟏}, 𝐰 is the time index that the abrupt change actually 
occurs. To ensure the longest time without false alarm and make detection independent 
of network traffic pattern, 𝐡 is suggested to be 𝟐𝐚 [60]. However, since 𝐡 is a bound 
rather than a true value, the above is a conservative estimation (upper bound) of the 
actual detection time. 
If AI is set as the normal state, the significant positive change in CUSUM implies 
the burst size is increasing when the state changes from AI to non-AI. It holds for the 
𝐀𝐈 → 𝐌𝐈 transition and 𝐀𝐈 → 𝐂𝐑 constant rate transition, while may not be true for non-
AI states whose burst size is decreased, e.g. 𝐀𝐈 → 𝐀𝐃, 𝐀𝐈 → 𝐌𝐃, and 𝐀𝐈 → 𝐂𝐑. To 
detect the abrupt negative change, the behavior detector is required expanded from one-
way to two-way.  Let 𝐗�𝐦 = 𝐗𝐦 + 𝐚 and  
𝐒�𝐤 = � 𝐗�𝐢𝒌
𝒊=𝛕𝐍
 , (40) 
i-th 𝐒�𝛕𝐍 = 𝟎  and 𝛎𝐧 denote the maximum continuous decrement of 𝐒�𝐧 until time 𝒏, then 
we have 
𝛎𝐦 = 𝐒�𝐦 − 𝐦𝐚𝐱
𝛕𝐍≤𝐤≤𝐦
𝐒�𝐤 , (41) 
and 
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�
𝛎𝐦 = �𝛎𝐦−𝟏 + 𝐗�𝐦 �−
𝛎𝛕𝐍 = 𝟎  . (42) 
Therefore, given a negative threshold 𝐍�, a decision function 𝐝𝐍(𝛎𝐦) can be used 
to detect the negative change such that ‘0’ means the original state is unchanged and ‘1’ 
the change of state occurs as follows 
𝐝𝐍(𝛎𝐦) = � 𝟎 𝐢𝐟 𝛎𝐦 > 𝐍�𝟏 𝐢𝐟 𝛎𝐦 ≤ 𝐍�   (43) 
Table 4 lists possible behavior states of a flow. A traditional TCP-Reno protocol 
has the MI state for the slow start phase, AI state for the congestion avoidance phase and 
MD state corresponding to packet loss. Opposite to AI state, we have the AD, which 
exists in TCP-Vegas to decrease its rate if the bottleneck queue length exceeds a 
threshold. CR is a major state of Vegas so that the TCP-Vegas flow can keep a constant 
rate for a longer time. Compared to CR, ZR means the zero rates, which can occur in 
some on-off flows. For flows neither showing the strong multiplicative change nor the 
additive change, their states are regarded as unknown, which means flows are affected 
by strong noises in networks. 
Table 4: State definition 
State Definition 
AI Additive Increase 
AD Additive Decrease 
MI Multiplicative Increase 
MD Multiplicative Decrease 
CR Constant Rate 
ZR Zero Rate 
Unknown Unknown State 
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AIMD is a typical behavior of TCP flows. Recall that 𝛏𝐢 represents the i-th 
estimated cwnd, the equation 𝛏𝐤 − 𝛏𝐤−𝟏 = 𝟏 holds for the AI behavior if no noise is 
introduced to the measurement. Therefore the linear gradient of 𝛏𝐤, e.g. 𝛏𝐤 − 𝛏𝐤−𝟏, is a 
good behavior metric for AI. The same reason is also applied to AD. Hence the behavior 
metric 𝐌𝐤 = 𝛏𝐤 − 𝛏𝐤−𝟏 will be defined as the linear gradient indicator to detect the 
additive change of cwnd in the CUSUM algorithm. 
For the MD behavior, the size of the congestion window doubles every RTT, i.e. 
the cwnd grows exponentially. The linear gradient is no longer suitable to detect the MI 
behavior because 𝐌𝐤 has to be a stationary random process to meet the requirement of 
CUSUM. If the multiplicative change occurs at 𝐑𝐓𝐓𝐢, then the following equation 
𝛏𝐢
𝛏𝐢−𝟏
= 𝐤 holds, where k is the multiplicative factor. By taking the logarithm of the ratio, 
we can transform the exponential change into the linear one as shown in Equation (44). 
𝐌𝐤 = 𝐥𝐨𝐠 � 𝛏𝐢𝛏𝐣−𝟏� = 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝛏𝐢) − 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝛏𝐢−𝟏). (44) 
The log gradient based on Equation (44) is therefore used as the metric of detecting the 
multiplicative change of the cwnd.  
Different from the linear and log gradient metrics, zero gradients is not based on 
the difference of two adjacent cwnds, but the cwnd only. For some ON-OFF flows, the 
zero gradient can be employed to identify the zero rate in the OFF period. Table 5 shows 
𝐌𝐤 of different gradients expressed in terms of 𝛏𝐢.      
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Table 5: Gradient-based behavior metrics 
𝐆𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐭  Definition 
Linear gradient 𝐌𝐤 = 𝛏𝐤 − 𝛏𝐤−𝟏 
Log gradient 𝐌𝐤 = 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝛏𝐤) − 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝛏𝐤−𝟏) 
Zero gradient 𝐌𝐤 = 𝛏𝐤 
 
Figure 32 shows the flow state is detected based on a set of CUSUM banks. The 
cwnd estimates are fed into each of the banks simultaneously. Then the decision system 
will ask CUSUM detectors if they think their predefined state changed. Based on the 
answers of all CUSUM detectors, the system will determine the current state of the flow. 
For AI, 𝐗𝐤 is denoted as 𝐌𝐤 − 𝛈 as shown in Equation (32), where 𝐌𝐤 = 𝛏𝐤 −
𝛏𝐤−𝟏 and 𝛈 = 𝟏 since cwnd increases by 1 after one RTT such that 𝐄(𝐗𝐤) = 𝐜 ≪ 𝟏 
holds in Equation (33). In practice, due to network noises, 𝐚, the upper bound of 𝐜 in 
Equation (34) is set to 1. Therefore 𝐗𝐧� = 𝐗𝐧 − 𝐚 is equivalent to 𝐗𝐧� = 𝐌𝐤 − 𝛃, where 
𝛃 = 𝟐, for the AI detection. Since 𝐡 = 𝟐𝐚 is suggested in [60] and the shortest detection 
delay is required, then  (𝛕𝐍 − 𝐰)+ is set to 1 and the Non-AI CUSM threshold 𝐍 in 
Equation (38) is equal to 1 based on Equation (39). 
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Figure 32: Detection of the flow behavior based on CUSUM banks 
 
To detect CRP, the CR with the positive change of cwnd, we have 𝛈 = 𝟎 in 
Equation (32) and set 𝐚 = 𝟏 in Equation (34). Then 𝐗𝐧� = 𝐌𝐤 − 𝛃, where 𝐌𝐤 is the 
linear gradient metric and 𝛃 = 𝟏 such that non-CR occurs if 𝛍𝐧 > 𝑵 as shown in 
Equation (38), where N=1, given the shortest detection delay. For the detection of ZEP, 
zero rate with the positive change, we have 𝐌𝐤 = 𝛏𝐤 and 𝐚 = 𝟏. 
Multiplicative change is significant in the congestion window size. Hence, 
multiplicative changes occur less frequently compared to additive changes. To detect the 
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MI behavior, different from the AI, CR and ZR detection, the CUSUM detector regards 
the non-MI the normal state and MI the abnormal state. Once the alarm flags, we say the 
flow is in the MI state. 𝐋𝐞𝐭  
𝛏𝐤
𝛏𝐤−𝟏
≤ 𝟐(𝟏 − 𝒑)  (45) 
indicate a non MI state, where 𝐩 is the percentage of the noise tolerance for the MI state. 
By taking the logarithm of Equation (45), we have 𝐌𝐤 = 𝐥𝐨𝐠𝟐(𝛏𝐤) − 𝐥𝐨𝐠𝟐 (𝛏𝐤−𝟏) with 
𝛈 = 𝟏 + 𝐥𝐨𝐠𝟐 (𝟏 − 𝐩) such that 𝐗𝐤 = 𝐌𝐤 − 𝛈. By setting the upperbound 𝐚 of mean of {𝐗𝐤} to 0, then we have 𝐗𝐧� = 𝐥𝐨𝐠𝟐(𝛏𝐤) − 𝐥𝐨𝐠𝟐(𝛏𝐤−𝟏) − 𝟏 − 𝐥𝐨𝐠𝟐 (𝟏 − 𝐩) and N is set 
to 𝐥𝐨𝐠𝟐(𝟏−𝟎.𝟓𝐩𝟏−𝐩 ) if 𝐄(𝐌𝐤) = 𝐥𝐨𝐠𝟐(𝟐 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝟎. 𝟓𝐩)) is regarded as the occurance of MI, 
where 𝐩 is set to 0.25.  
For the detection of the decrease change of the cwnd value, the same logic can be 
applied to set CUSUM parameters for MD, AD, CRN and ZEN. Table 6 shows behavior 
metrics for distinct CUSUM banks and Table 7 defines the detection sequence and 
CUSUM threshold for each CUSUM bank. 
Table 6: Behavior metrics of CUSUM detectors 
Detector Behavior Metric MI 𝐌𝐤 = 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝛏𝐤) − 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝛏𝐤−𝟏) MD 𝐌𝐤 = 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝛏𝐤) − 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝛏𝐤−𝟏) Non-AI 𝐌𝐤 = 𝛏𝐤 − 𝛏𝐤−𝟏 Non-AD 𝐌𝐤 = 𝛏𝐤 − 𝛏𝐤−𝟏 Non-ZEP 𝐌𝐤 = 𝛏𝐤 Non-ZEN 𝐌𝐤 = 𝛏𝐤 Non-CRP 𝐌𝐤 = 𝛏𝐤 − 𝛏𝐤−𝟏 Non-CRN 𝐌𝐤 = 𝛏𝐤 − 𝛏𝐤−𝟏 
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Table 7: Parameters of CUSUM banks 
Detector Detection Sequence CUSUM Threshold Non-ZEP 𝐗𝐧� = 𝐌𝐤 − 𝟏 𝐍 = 𝟏 Non-ZEN 𝐗𝐧� = 𝐌𝐤 + 𝟏 𝐍 = −𝟏 Non-CRP 𝐗𝐧� = 𝐌𝐤 − 𝟏 𝐍 = 𝟏 Non-CRN 𝐗𝐧� = 𝐌𝐤 + 𝟏 𝐍 = −𝟏 Non-AI 𝐗𝐧� = 𝐌𝐤 − 𝟐 𝐍 = 𝟏 Non-AD 𝐗𝐧� = 𝐌𝐤 + 𝟐 𝐍 = −𝟏 MI 𝐗𝐧� = 𝐌𝐤 − 𝐥𝐨𝐠𝟐(𝟏. 𝟓) 𝐍 = 𝐥𝐨𝐠𝟐(𝟏. 𝟏𝟔) MD 𝐗𝐧� = 𝐌𝐤 + 𝐥𝐨𝐠𝟐(𝟏. 𝟓) 𝐍 = −𝐥𝐨𝐠𝟐(𝟏. 𝟏𝟔)   
Since the behavior state changes frequently, the CUSUM has to be reset to make 
the state detection work properly based on following rules: 
1. Each CUSUM bank is assigned a priority. 
2. Priority orders of increase detection: MI > Non-AI > Non-CRP > Non-ZEP. 
3. Priority orders of decrease detection: MD > Non-AD > Non-CRN > Non-
ZEN. 
4. When a state is detected, all CUSUM banks with the priority less than equal 
to the detected one are reset to 0. 
Again, the operation workflow of the behavior detection system is shown in Figure 32. 
 
5.5 Lossy Finite State Machine of Detecting Unknown Protocols 
Each TCP protocol has its own pattern of state transitions. The abnormal state 
transition is an indication of unknown protocols. Given a 5-tuple deterministic finite 
automata (DFA) 𝐌 = (𝐐, 𝚺, 𝛅, 𝐪𝟎, 𝐅) is defined as follows: 
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1. a finite set of states (𝐐)  
2. a finite set of input symbols called the alphabet (𝚺) 
3. a transition function (𝛅 : 𝐐 × 𝚺 → 𝐐) 
4. a start state (𝐪𝟎 ∈ 𝐐) 
5. a set of accept states (𝐅 ⊆ 𝐐) 
Transitions between states in the finite state machine are based on the  RTT 
estimates and cwnd estimates. The behavior of well-known protocols can be defined by 
𝐌 and used as the ground truth to detect other protocols. No estimation can be 100% 
correct. Packet loss, excessive delay or retransmission, and any other traffic disruptions, 
may lead to false state identification. To cope with these conditions, additional states to 
account for these disruptions are added to the congestion control states. In Figure 33, the 
solid circle at the right side shows the finite state machine of TCP-Reno. The dashed 
circle contains aberrant states at the left side.  
q3MI
AI
MD
AD
CR
Unknown
Aberrant Transition Count
Normal Transition Count
Anmaly Threshold
 
Figure 33: TCP-Reno finite state machine 
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The aberrant transition count (ATC) will be increased by 1 when an illegal state 
transition occurs; the error transition will be ignored if ATC is less than the anomaly 
threshold. The ATC will be reset to 0 if a normal transition occurs in the FSM. When 
ATC is updated and its value exceeds the anomaly threshold, the aberrant transition 
count (ATC) will be increased by 1. On the other hand, the normal transition count 
(NTC) represents how many times the state transition of a flow follows the protocol 
DFA. NTC is increased by 1 for each well-defined transition. 
Given a detection ratio threshold 𝐑𝐭𝐡 and a specific number N of samples, we say 
a flow belongs to the TCP protocol defined by the DFA if   
𝐑 = 𝐀𝐓𝐂𝐍𝐓𝐂 < 𝐑𝐭𝐡  (46) 
based on N samples. Then flows of different protocols will be identified using the R-
based pattern.  
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CHAPTER VI  
PERFORMANCE OF PACKET FLOW ANOMALY DETECTION 
 
6.1 Experiment Configuration 
To verify the detection rate of the packet flow anomaly detection system, we use 
NS2 to generate flows and set the dumbbell as the topology as shown in Figure 34. For 
the link of Si to O1, where i is an integer, its bandwidth is 10 Mbps and propagation 
delay is 10 ms. The bottleneck between O1  and O2 has the bandwidth 10 Mbps and 
transmission delay 20 ms. For links of O2 to Rj, where j is an arbitrary integer, its 
bandwidth and propagation delay are the same as the links of Si  to O1. 
Based on the configuration of Figure 34, five different experiments are 
performed to evaluate the feasibility and performance of the flow anomaly detection 
system.   
S2
S1
Sn
R1
R2
Rn
O1 O2
10 Mb, 10ms
10 Mb, 20ms
 
 
Figure 34: Network topology of experiments 
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6.2 Performance Evaluation 
6.2.1 Cwnd Estimation  
Figure 35 shows the dynamic change of cwnd using the approach of Lomb-based 
packet counting. From the diagram, the proposed cwnd estimation method does capture 
the characteristic of the slow start and AIMD of TCP-Reno flows.  
  
 
Figure 35: Cwnd estimates of TCP Reno flows   
Figure 36 shows the outcome of state detection of one of 10 TCP Reno flows, 
unknown states are the change of congestion windows between additive change and 
multiplicative change. Because of the high noise environment, the additive change can 
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be easily detected as the constant rate. For TCP Reno, AI, MI and MD are three possible 
states.  Figure 37 shows the count of the normal transitions and that of aberrant 
transitions for each flow. The number of right transitions is higher than its counterpart. 
Figure 38 represents the ratio of the right transitions to the error transitions for each 
flow. The ratios of the 10 flows are 0.209, 0.168, 0.129, 0.140, 0.126, 0.171, 0.119, 
0.221, 0.172, and 0.114 respectively. Among all these ratios, the maximum one is 0.221. 
If the ratio threshold is set to be higher than 0.221, then the detection rate will be 100%. 
    
Figure 36: State transition diagram 
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Figure 37: Count of ATC and NTC 
 
  
Figure 38: Ratio of ATC to NTC 
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Because the detection rate is dependent on the ratio threshold, Figure 39 shows 
the detection rate in different ratio thresholds.  Although the higher threshold leads to the 
higher detection rate, it may also cause more false positives. In the following 
experiments 2 and 3, we will show its impact to false positives.  
  
Figure 39: Detection rate versus ratio threshold. 
 
6.2.2 Differentiation of TCP-Reno from CBR  
Based on the same topology as shown in experiment one. Experiment two aims 
to investigate the detection rate and false alarm rate among different flows. Therefore, 5 
more CBR, constant bit rate, flows with 1Mb/sec each are added into the simulation. 
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Since the Lomb-periodogram is applied to compute RTTs and cwnds of each 
flow, CBR flows also have “virtual” cwnds measured at the access point as shown in 
Figure 40. Due to network buffer overflow and packet loss, the estimated cwnds of CBR 
flows are not always constant, but influenced by the network congestion conditions.   
 
Figure 40: Virtual congestion window estimates of UDP 
 
By feeding the estimated cwnds into the CUSUM-based FSM, the ratio of ETC 
to RTC is a good indicator to classify TCP-Reno flows and CBR flows into two areas as 
shown in Figure 41. The ratios of 10 TCP-Reno flows are 0.178, 0.195, 0.234, 0.148, 
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0.129, 0.227, 0.165, 0.158, 0.181, and 0.209 respectively. On the other hand, the ratios 
of 5 CBR flows are 7.653, 6.859, 8.458, 9.155 and 10.268 respectively. Therefore, by 
properly setting the 𝐑𝐭𝐡 between 0.234 and 6.859, two flow types can be identified 
correctly. 
  
Figure 41: Classification of TCP-Reno and non-Reno flows based on the ratio of ETC to 
RTC. 
 
6.2.3 Differentiation of TCP-Reno from TCP-Vegas 
This experiment is the same as experiment two except that 5 TCP-Vegas flows 
are used instead of 5 CBR flows. In the network area, the two most popular TCP 
protocols for investigation are TCP-Reno and TCP-Vegas. For Vegas, its congestion 
control protocol is depicted as follows. In the slow start phase, TCP-Vegas doubles 
  
93 
 
 𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝𝐢 every two RTTs to detect and prevent the packet loss. When the network queue 
length is greater than 𝛄, Vegas will enter the congestion avoidance phase and reduce  𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝𝐢 by 1/8. In congestion avoidance, Vegas infers the expected rate as  𝐜𝐰𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐁𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐑T𝐓, 
where 𝐁𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐑𝐓𝐓 is the minimum of all measured RTT,  and physical rate as 
𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐬𝐦𝐢𝐭𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐛𝐲𝐭𝐞𝐬
𝐦𝐞𝐚𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐝 𝐑𝐓𝐓 , then it adjusts the window size as follows 
 𝒄𝒘𝒏𝒅𝒊(𝒏 + 𝟏) = � 𝒄𝒘𝒏𝒅𝒊(𝒏) + 𝟏 , 𝐝𝐢𝐟𝐟 < 𝜶         𝒄𝒘𝒏𝒅𝒊(𝒏)       , 𝛂 ≤ 𝐝𝐢𝐟𝐟 ≤ 𝛃, 𝒄𝒘𝒏𝒅𝒊(𝒏) − 𝟏 , 𝐝𝐢𝐟𝐟 > 𝜷           (47) 
where 𝐝𝐢𝐟𝐟 =  𝒄𝒘𝒏𝒅𝒊
𝐁𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐑𝐓𝐓
−
𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐬𝐦𝐢𝐭𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐛𝐲𝐭𝐞𝐬
𝐦𝐞𝐚𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐝 𝐑𝐓𝐓  is an estimate of the number of packets of the 
flow that are backlogged in the network.  
Figure 42 (a) shows that the congestion windows of TCP-Vegas flows tend to 
stay at a constant level longer compared to the AIMD property of TCP-Reno flows. 
Therefore TCP-Vegas behaves conservatively corresponding to the network congestion. 
Figure 42 (b) is the ground truth of congestion windows of 5 TCP Vegas flows.  Figure 
43 shows TCP-Reno flows and TCP-Vegas flows can be properly distinguished if Rth is 
set between 0.262 and 5.714 given that the anomaly threshold is set to 1.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 42: Congestion windows of 5 TCP-Vegas flows: (a) estimated states, and (b) 
actual states. 
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Figure 43: Classification of two different TCP flavors 
 
6.2.4 Classification of Mixing Flows Using TCP-Reno FSM 
To study the influence of different flows on the detection rate, 50 flows 
consisting of 15 TCP-Reno flows, 15 TCP-Vegas flows, 10 CBR flows of 1 Mb/sec and 
10 CBR flows of 2 Mb/sec are sent into the dumbbell topology, where the bandwidth of 
the o1-o2 link is set to 50 Mb/sec and other configurations are unchanged.  
The goal of this experiment is to verify if the TCP-Reno FSM is able to 
distinguish TCP-Reno flows from others. Figure 44 shows the estimated cwnd size for 
flows of different protocols. In the diagram, TCP-Reno shows the saw-tooth shape; 
TCP-Vegas is adaptive to the congestion condition using AI and AD and tends to have 
an unchanged cwnd if the network traffic does not change significantly. In addition, 
  
96 
 
CBR flows have the stronger constant rate property compared to TCP-Vegas because 
they are not responding to the traffic congestion.  
Figure 45 shows that the ratio of ATC to NTC is between 0.14 and 0.59 for TCP-
Reno flows, between 0.79 and 4.13 for TCP-Vegas, between 5.95 and 15.24 for 1MBps 
CBR flows and between 4.95 and 8.74 for 2Mbps CBR flows. Therefore, TCP-Reno 
flows and Non-Reno ones can be distinguished if 𝐑𝐭𝐡 is properly set between 0.59 and 
0.79.  Table 8 lists the mean and variance of R of 50 flows. That being said, it is difficult 
to differentiate the two classes when their R values have much smaller differences than 
in earlier cases due to the sharply diminished mean and variance values. This situation 
was caused by significant presence of CBR flows, which significantly increases 
congestion conditions, so that estimation of the RTT for both Reno and Vegas flows 
tends to be disrupted, which then translates into erroneous predictions of congestion 
control states.  The gradually converged behaviors between Reno and Vegas can be 
visualized in Figure 44, where the sharply distinct dynamics of their congestion window 
changes diminished.  
Table 8: Mean and variance of ratio of ATC to NTC 
Flow ID Protocol Mean Variance 
1-15 Reno 0.264 0.011 
16-30 Vegas 1.109 0.709 
31-40 CBR(1Mbps) 11.609 10.681 
41-50 CBR(2Mbps) 6.644 1.6246 
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Figure 44: Estimates of congestion windows. 
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Figure 45: Classification in mixed flow types 
 
6.2.5 Classification of Mixing Flows Using TCP-Vegas FSM 
In this experiment, we show that a FSM based on TCP-Vegas can detect non-
TCP-Vegas flows with 100% detection rate and one false alarm among 50 flows.  
Figure 46 shows the state transitions of flows of three different protocols. 
Compared with Reno, Vegas has a lower transition frequency and prefers to stay at the 
CR state (state 1). In addition, Vegas is a conservative protocol so that its rate 
adjustment is not drastic and therefore the probability it enters the MD state (state 6) is 
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lower than that of Reno. CBR flows stay longer in the CR state as expected because 
CBR flows are not controlled by the congestion protocol and only influenced by the 
queue delay and overflow. For CBR flows, the one with the higher rate has a more 
frequent state transition than that with the lower rate. This is because the higher rate 
CBR has more packets in the network, thus increasing the probability of packet loss and 
delay, which will respond to the state change later.   
 
Figure 46: Cwnd dynamics of different flow types 
 
Since the major property of TCP-Vegas is the constant rate, we construct a 
simple FSM, as shown in Table 9 based on this major feature and observe the 
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performance of its detection outcome. Figure 47 shows the ratio of 50 flows plotted in 
Figure 48. 
Table 9: Ratio of ATC to NTC for 50 flows 
Flow ID Protocol Ratio 
1-15 Reno 0.74-1.26 
16-30 Vegas 0.39-0.54 with an outlier 0.11 
31-40 CBR(1Mbps) 0.002-0.073 
41-50 CBR(2Mbps) 0.085-0.241 
 
The CR FSM can distinguish Reno from Vegas with 100% detection rate if 𝐑𝐭𝐡 
is set between 0.54 and 0.74. The mean of R of 15 Reno flows is 1.034 and its 
corresponding variance is 0.031. On the other hand, the mean of R of 15 Vegas flows is 
0.430 and its corresponding variance is 0.009. 
Although Reno and Vegas can be distinguished, one 𝐑𝐭𝐡 cannot classify Vegas 
and CBR because the R of CBR flows is lower than that of TCP-Vegas flows. The 
reason is that Vegas is adaptive to the network congestion and therefore cannot stay at 
the CR state as long as CBR flows do. However, if another 𝐑𝐭𝐡 regarded as the lower-
bound threshold is set between 0.54 and 0.241, then Vegas flows and CBR flows can be 
classified into two groups with only one false alarm, which is an outlier of Vegas flows, 
among 50 simulated flows in the noisy and dynamic networks. Furthermore, CBR flows 
with two different rates are able to be classified with 100% correct rate if 𝐑𝐭𝐡 is set 
between 0.073 and 0.085.  
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Figure 47: Simple TCP-Vegas FSM 
 
 
Figure 48: Detection outcome based on Vegas FSM 
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CHAPTER VII  
CONCLUSION 
 
Content and packet flow anomaly detections are important to cloud computing, 
which relies on networks to cope with the big data from different types of devices. To 
deal with content and packet flow anomalies, multiple approaches have been proposed, 
studied and verified in this dissertation.   
For the detection of content-based anomalies, I proposed the PEC framework 
utilizing the competitive aging-scoring scheme to identify suspicious and bulk feature 
instances, which are later stored into the blacklist to detect the UNE. Considering the 
large amount of packets passing through the gateway, PEC takes O(1) time to update the 
score and age of onset feature instances given the limited memory. The birth of a feature 
instance starts from its first time arrival at the system, and the death of an instance 
occurs when its score is not updated and other instances come to occupy the whole age 
table. A probability model based on the Poisson process is built to derive PEC 
parameters consisting of the score threshold and age table size given the specified 
detection rate and latency. Multiple simulations have shown the accuracy of the model 
by collecting multiple samples of the detection rate and latency based on the model-
derived S and M, where each sample is the mean of 100 runs.  
To further verify the feasibility of PEC, the prototype of PEC is integrated with 
the sendmail application to detect URL links of UNE, albeit the system can be easily 
expanded to filter other features. URL links extracted from the corpus of spamming-
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phishing messages are used to generate UNE messages, which are then mixed with 
regular messages to test the prototype. To meet the performance challenges, an O(1) 
spinning wheel algorithm is developed for the aging-scoring function. Experimental 
results on a Xeon based server show that PEC can handle 1.2M score updates, hashing 
and matching 7k URL links, and parsing of 200 messages bodies of average size 1.5kB. 
The lossy PEC detection system can be easily scaled up and down by progressive 
selection of detection features and detection thresholds. It can be used alone or as an 
early screening tool for existing infrastructure to defeat major UNE flooding. 
For the packet flow anomaly detection, my goal is to detect the anomalous and 
undefined protocols using the inter-packet time as the input sample. The detection 
process consists of several important steps, which are RTT estimation, cwnd estimation, 
behavior state identification, and protocol detection. The method I proposed is based on 
the signal processing and different from model-driven methods, which depict the long-
term behavior of flows from the perspective of statistics and probabilities. Due to quick 
changing of the congestion window, the dynamics of flow rates are the signal to 
determine the protocol. The model based on the average concept cannot capture and 
detect the transient change of the flow rate.    
Because the flow rate is the congestion window size divided by the round trip, 
the estimation of RTT is the first step to infer the flow rate. By the study, we found that 
the traditional DFT method is incapable of estimating RTT within a reasonable error 
range. To reduce the estimation error, I proposed the EWMA Lomb periodogram 
approach, which considers the input noise reduction and unevenly spaced sampling 
  
104 
 
simultaneously. NS2 simulations have shown EWMA Lomb periodogram has more 
accurate RTT estimates than the DFT filter bank and genuine Lomb periodogram. 
Recognizing that no estimation is perfect and errors can be accumulated from the 
RTT estimates to the cwnd estimates, several methods are studied in this dissertation.   A 
low-pass filter is one of the widely used approaches to reduce the signal noises. If the 
estimation window is based on N RTTs, the variance of the estimation error can be 
decreased by 1/N. However, the low-pass filter is incapable of detecting the instant cwnd 
change such as MD, which typically occurs very shortly compared to AI. On the other 
hand, the high-pass filter cannot reduce the noise when the flow is in the AI state.  
I proposed the approach using CUSUM banks to detect the behavior state of 
flows, where CUSUM is typically used to detect the change point of a signal sequence. 
CUSUM itself can filter the noise, and its algorithm parameters determine the detection 
sensitivity. By cascading a set of CUSUM banks, the relationship between different 
behavior states is created, where each CUSUM bank is in charge of one of the behavior 
states. Totally, eight CUSUM banks are created; four of them are for the cwnd increase 
detection and the residual four for cwnd decrease detection. A control policy is 
developed to reset different CUSUM banks and determine the current state.        
Since the protocol behavior can be expressed by its behavior state change, e.g. 
TCP-Reno is designed to transit from MI to AI, but not AI to MI, the protocol-based 
FSM is created to detect if a transition is legal or not. By defining the anomaly threshold 
and the ratio R, the number of aberrant transitions over that of normal transitions, flows 
of undefined protocols can be identified in the R-based pattern. Multiple NS2 
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simulations based on the dumbbell topology have shown that (1) TCP-Reno flows and 
CBR flows can be classified using the R-based pattern, (2) TCP-Reno flows and TCP-
Vegas flows can be differentiated, (3) TCP-Reno, TCP-Vegas, CBR1 and CBR2 can be 
differentiated using the Reno-based FSM, where the rate of CBR1 flows is different 
from that of CBR2, and (4) TCP-Reno, TCP-Vegas, CBR1 and CBR2 can be classified 
using the Vegas-based FSM, i.e. the proposed approach in this dissertation can be 
applied to different TCP flavors.  
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